|
|
THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONALISM Although nation states had existed since medieval times (eg England & France) Nationalism as a political concept only dates to the time of the French Revolution. Until that stage countries (or states) were the personal possession of a particular ruler or dynasty. The ruler might rule over one homogenous people or a number of peoples. With the exception of Switzerland and some of the city states of Italy & Germany the only republic was a new one – USA. The French Revolution brought about a consciousness of Frenchness; the sovereignty of the people and the idea that national identity was based on a common homeland and culture. This concept was then exported to other parts of Europe, sometimes spontaneously and sometimes by the force of French arms. Conquest by France led to a reaction by many races who did not want to be dominated by France but who wanted to exist as Germans, Spaniards etc. After the defeat of France many of the old rulers were restored (either ruling over many nationalities or else over a part of a cultural nation (for instance the king of Hanover ruled over one of the 39 German states). Many of the peoples of Europe became restive and wanted a new beginning as the people of a nation state. The most enthusiastic supporters of nationalism were frequently not the old ruling class who had a vested interest in the restored or old system. The most enthusiastic supporters were the professional and commercial middleclass. At first the peasantry were slow to identify with nationalism as it was too abstract a concept; they were concerned with surviving and gaining control of the land they occupied. Mazzini, one of the fathers of C19 nationalism found it virtually impossible to mobilise the Italian peasantry. O’Connell in Ireland did mobilise the peasantry with his campaign for Catholic Emancipation and his attacks on the Act of Union. A great and glorious Irish past was rediscovered (or invented) by the romantic Young Irelanders of the 1840s. This was manifested in the glorification of rebellion and the United Irishmen of 1798 were taken as a model. From the 1840s Irish nationalism was characterised by two polarities: moderate or constitutional nationalism that was not primarily concerned with full independence but with devolution (Home Rule) and revolutionary republicanism which remained numerically smaller than the constitutional form of nationalism. These two approaches were not mutually exclusive and often cross-fertilised each other. Both O’Connell and Parnell led constitutional movements but they sounded more extreme than they were. “Brinkmanship” was their deliberate tactic. Just as O’Connell mobilised the peasantry between 1823 & the mid-1840s so Parnell mobilised the peasantry on a more permanent basis in the late 1870s & ‘80s. Generally the constitutional form of nationalism was catholic-oriented and the republican variety claimed to unite Irishmen of whatever religion (the United Irish ideal). In practice, however, nationalism only appealed to catholics, though some of the most prominent nationalist leaders were protestants (the exception to the rule). Before 1798: Members of the Anglo-Irish ascendancy were proud of their distinctive identity – they were protestant and not English. They looked to Britain for support but they often resented English dominance and the English assumption of superiority. 1798/1803: United Irish radical & revolutionary ideals failed; an abortive second attempt was tried by Robert Emmet. These two rebellions were held up by later revolutionaries as glorious attempts to overthrow British tyranny. In particular the “united” aspect was stressed as was the concept of suffering/dying for Ireland. 1823/43: O’Connell successfully led a mass peasant movement to achieve Catholic Emancipation (1829) and an unsuccessful mass movement to have the Union repealed. He rejected violence but often allowed himself to sound extreme (brinkmanship). In the 1840s his younger followers were inspired by the possibility of what he might achieve (Repeal) but alienated by his Catholicism. More and more they were inspired by a romantic view of Ireland’s past and the glory of rebellion. 1848/1868: These “angry young men” staged the abortive Young Ireland rebellion of 1848; in exile in the late 1850s they founded the Fenian (IRB) movement that advocated republicanism, armed revolution and complete independence from Britain. They failed but the movement was particularly strong in USA which had received many Irish migrants after the Great Famine. Fenianism was to survive till C20; in the early C20 it was revived. 1870/79: The Fenian rising (1867) meant that Gladstone had to consider reforms in Ireland; he disestablished the C of I and brought in a land reform; these measures did not kill off Irish nationalism which re-emerged in a more constitutional form led by Isaac Butt. He was able to gain support (temporarily) from Anglicans who felt betrayed by Britain because of Disestablishment and Fenians and their sympathisers who realised rebellion had not succeeded. He founded the Home Rule movement (devolution) and in 1874 had achieved the superficially spectacular support of a parliamentary group of 59 MPs. 1879/1885: Butt’s style of leadership was too gentlemanly and ineffectual; Parnell and a handful of other MPs wanted a more vigorous approach – they used obstructionism in the House of Commons to gain attention. Parnell achieved domination over the Home Rule party during the Land War (1879-81); he used the Land League & then the National League to achieve this. By an adroit use of confrontational brinkmanship he also forced Gladstone to take him and his goals seriously. 1886/91: After the 1885 election Gladstone announced his conversion to Home Rule. Parnell & circumstances had won over a British political leader to a policy of moderate Irish devolution. The 1886 1st H Rule bill was unsuccessful but it caused a realignment of parliamentary politics: Gladstonian Liberals and Parnell’s nationalists became an alliance as did the opposing combination of Conservatives & Liberal Unionists. For the first time Irish MPs were not in a permanent minority but could obtain a working majority with their British allies at election time. The nationalist hope of a successful combination with the Liberals was blown by Parnell’s disgrace and death. This was accompanied by serious splits in the nationalist party. 1891/1914: Until 1900 the Home Rule party remained split; however much nationalist effort went into cultural nationalism (the Gaelic League; the GAA and the Irish literary revival – in particular the influence of Yeate’s play Cathleen ni Houlihon); moreover the IRB revived and was inspired paradoxically by the armed defiance of the Ulster Unionists who brought the gun back into Irish politics. In 1913 the IRB infiltrated the Irish Volunteers a nationalist paramilitary body that had been founded in imitation of the Ulster Volunteer Force, a Unionist body designed to wreck the possibility of Home Rule coming about. A new nationalist strand was introduced in the early C20 by Griffith who founded Sinn Fein. This was not a violent movement; SF policy was one of civil disobedience and a programme of withdrawal of Irish MPs from Westminster who would set up their own parliament in Dublin. By the beginning of WW1 Redmond’s home rule party and the Liberal government had got a Home Rule Act on to the statute book; its implementation would have been thwarted by the Ulster Unionists and the Conservative opposition. As it was, its implementation was suspended for the duration of hostilities. 1914/21: If WW1 had been short and Home Rule had been implemented quickly and successfully Redmond would have carried off the greatest achievement in nationalist history, even the IRB would have accepted the situation and Sinn Fein certainly would have. However WW1 was long and bloody; furthermore Redmond had pledged the Irish Volunteers (who were renamed the National Volunteers) to the British war effort. He had done this to demonstrate that home rule nationalists were not disloyal and would be satisfied with a limited and devolved parliament and administration (Home Rule); he also believed that the defence of Belgium was a just cause. This was a tremendous political gamble as no Irish nationalist had ever supported a British war effort; if the war was not short & successful he and delayed Home Rule would be discredited and the nationalist cause would fall into the hands of the waiting men of violence. Patrick Pearse of the IRB intended to use the rump of the Irish Volunteers who had not supported the British war effort to start their own revolution with German help. This happened at Easter 1916 though Pearse and some of the other leaders realised they were doomed to fail. The poet Pearse believed in the necessity of the blood sacrifice and that the martyring of the rebels would inspire other Irishmen to a more successful revolution. The Easter rebellion was a failure and its leaders (including Pearse) were executed; they did become martyrs and support for thwart effort declined and Redmond became increasingly isolated and irrelevant (he died in 1918). The British govt wrongly blamed Sinn Fein for the rebellion, they therefore became martyrs. Using its usual carrot & stick combination the British then released the prisoners and internees, these men formed a joint Sinn Fein/Irish Volunteer front in 1917. The British extended conscription law to Ireland in 1918 and this turned more moderates to Sinn Fein/Irish Volunteers. In the 1918 coupon election the Home Rule nationalists were virtually annihilated and Sinn Fein won 73 seats (more than the Squiffite Liberals or the Labour party). Sinn Fein MPs refused to take their seats in Westminster and met in Dublin declaring a republic; officially they did not intend to start a guerrilla war but to use the Irish Volunteers (IRA) if attacked or arrested by the British. However a number of volunteer commanders took independent action and a war (1919-21) developed with Crown Forces. IRA intelligence was superior to that of the British and by a combination of efficiency, ruthlessness and intimidation (largely the work of Michael Collins) Sinn Fein consolidated support and Britain became increasingly unwilling to continue the fight providing Sinn Fein settled for less than a republic, accepting Dominion status instead. Though it split the Sinn Fein/IRA Front Dominion status within the Empire was accepted. On the face of it violent methods had succeeded and constitutional moderation had failed; however Sinn Fein settled for less than a republic and the dominion of the Irish Free State became one of the few working parliamentary democracies in the 1920s & 30s. The Irish parliamentary tradition that had been nurtured by O’Connell, Butt, Parnell & Redmond at Westminster survived. O’Connell & Parnell had been parliamentarians but they had had an ambiguous relationship with extremism; revolutionary activity and constitutionalism may have been polarities but they were not mutually exclusive but more the particular movement of the time to further nationalist goals. With the acceptance of dominion status in The Treaty of December 1921, nationalism seemed to have achieved its goal – the Union was ended. However 6 of the 9 counties of Ulster remained in Union with Great Britain; as the British resolve to preserve the Union wavered and weakened so the determination of Ulster Unionists to preserve the Union for Ulster (or most of it) grew. Not only did nationalism evolve, so Ulster Unionism developed and British policy evolved. Britain had established the Union in 1800 to enhance stability; the ending of the Union for 26 counties (and its preservation for 6) was a C20 response to enhance stability: providing the Irish Free State remained within the Empire and British strategic interests were preserved the Union could be ended; its furtherance would merely destabilise the British Isles and the Empire. |