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7. THE LIBERALS AND HOME RULE In the years following the Phoenix Park murders and the formation of the National League Parnell tightened his grip on the home rule party. This ensured that at the next election, during November and December 1885, Parnell led a stronger and more homogenous party. The party was to have fewer landlords and fewer MPs of Fenian extraction than previously. Parnell in the last year or so of the Liberal government started to explore the possibility of an agreement with the Conservatives, he did not just dwell on the possibility of reviving an understanding with the Liberals. In 1883 and 1884 Parnell fostered links with the catholic church. He supported the hierarchy over the long-running university issue and dropped his support for the atheistic Bradlaugh. His alliance with the catholic church was also aided by a change in the views of the hierarchy. Like O’Connell before him it was not sufficient to mobilise the peasantry, the support of the leadership of the church was also essential. The Central Board Scheme Joseph Chamberlain, who had pioneered so much in English municipal government, devised his Central Board Scheme as a substitute for home rule. It would give Ireland “the widest possible self-government … consistent with the integrity of the Empire”; Chamberlain’s two main concerns were local government and the fostering of imperial links. Chamberlain’s imperialism was still in its relative infancy, but it was the bedrock of his opposition to home rule. Although somewhat suspicious of Chamberlain’s motives Parnell showed a degree of enthusiasm for the Central Board concept. The scheme would deal with education, transport and the coordination of a revamped county administration. For Parnell it was the first step towards home rule, which he saw as operating alongside the Central Board Scheme. Chamberlain, who had a keen interest in Irish affairs, was encouraged to believe by William O’Shea (once more a broker and go-between as in 1882) that Parnell had accepted this idea as a watered-down form of home rule. Chamberlain was furthermore encouraged by the seemingly positive attitude of the catholic hierarchy. Chamberlain was piqued by Parnell’s rejection of the scheme once it became apparent that Chamberlain was completely hostile to home rule and his scheme was a substitute for an Irish legislature. Gladstone, who had allowed Chamberlain to toy with the Central Board idea, together with the rest of the cabinet was not prepared to adopt the scheme. Although a non-starter the reactions to the Central Board idea are of some significance: its rejection by both Parnell and the Liberals help explain Chamberlain’s later bitterness towards both the home rulers and Gladstone, his pride had been hurt. This does not however account for his opposition to home rule (which was based on his view of the empire), but it does go someway towards an understanding of the virulence of his later attitude. Gladstone’s cavalier treatment of the scheme is illustrative of his self-absorbed arrogance, he made no attempt either then or later to accommodate or conciliate Chamberlain. There could not be room in the same party for two such supreme egotists. Moreover Captain O’Shea’s role as a go-between revealed his limitations, his rather pathetic pretensions and his duplicitous nature. By the early summer of 1885 Gladstone’s government was flagging. The Prime Minister at 75 years of age seemed to have lost much of his drive and seemed to be soldiering on so that Hartington and Chamberlain did not tear the Liberal party apart. He was no longer the GOM (the “Grand Old Man”), he had become the MOG (the “murderer of Gordon”); unpopularity and internal party squabbles seemed to be getting the better of him. His government fell in mid-June following the resignation of Chamberlain and two other ministers. Parnell had joined with Salisbury and the Conservatives in bringing down the government. With the collapse of the Central Board scheme it had been clear that little could be expected from the Liberals. Moreover Lord Randolph Churchill (in some ways the brilliant and unorthodox counterpart of Chamberlain on the Conservative benches) had intimated that the Conservatives would not renew coercion. Parnell and the Conservatives There was no dissolution of parliament and Salisbury formed a caretaker government. It was in the interests of all that the current reforms, the 3rd Reform Act (1884) and the Redistribution of Seats Act (1885) should be fully in place for the forthcoming election. In the meantime Salisbury’s ministry remained amenable and actually courted Parnell and his party. In many ways more could be achieved for Ireland from a Conservative ministry than from the Liberals. The Conservatives were far more sympathetic to the concept of catholic schools (the catholic bishops had endorsed the home rule party and had entrusted it with the safeguarding of education). Conservative control over the Lords would facilitate further land reforms and the completion of a home rule bill. Essentially Parnell was a “green tory”, he saw a place for responsible nationally minded landlords in a home rule Ireland; his party on non- national matters was conservative by nature. In a new parliament there would be few of the Liberal/Whiggish tendency within the National League. Carnarvon and Ashbourne In particular the new Lord Lieutenant, Lord Carnarvon, seemed open to the possibility of home rule. He and Parnell met secretly in London and their impressions of each other were largely positive. In reality there was too large a gap between them, as there had been between Chamberlain and Parnell; that however was not at the time an issue and both men were relatively enthusiastic as there was the possibility of closer ties between their parties. Salisbury was not averse to the development of these Parnell-Carnarvon feelers. If Parnell wished to make approaches to the Conservatives, Salisbury would not disabuse him. Nor was he prepared to indicate to Carnarvon how isolated his views were within the party and cabinet; nationalist overtures were therefore allowed to run. In concrete terms the Conservatives had delivered within two months a major land reform that seemed to show their good faith. The Ashbourne Act provided capital of £5m (later raised to £10m) for the entire purchase price for tenants whose landlords were willing to sell. This was a marked improvement on Gladstone’s terms of 1870 (when only two-thirds could be advanced) or 1881 (when three-quarters could be loaned to the tenant). Moreover the rate of interest was reduced from 5% to 4% and the repayment term was lengthened to 49 years. Though the impact of the Act was not that great it was a Conservative precedent that showed their apparent good faith to Ireland in general and the National League in particular. Parnell and Gladstone Parnell was also sounding out Gladstone. Gladstone was however less accommodating to the Irish, he had been approached by Katherine O’Shea on Parnell’s behalf. Gladstone seems to have believed that such auctioneering between opposition parties was incorrect if not immoral; the Irish should make approaches to the government of the day, who might or might not be prepared to countenance a deal. At this stage Gladstone would undoubtedly have preferred the Conservatives to make a move on home rule. As indicated above they would have been able to influence the Lords, moreover as the matter would be divisive and controversial, it was preferable that the ‘poisoned chalice’ of home rule should be accepted by the Conservatives. The political risks involved would then largely fall on the Conservatives, although bipartisan support would be forthcoming from Gladstone and the Liberals (but maybe not from the party as a whole). After all Gladstone had been a member of Peel’s government that had fallen due to the contentious issue of the repeal of the Corn Laws. In 1845 Lord John Russell had declined to take office and repeal the Corn Laws despite the fact that in principle he believed Repeal to be correct. Why damage one’s own party when the Conservatives were already in government? Gladstone’s conversion to Home Rule It would be a difficult task to convince the members of either British party of the merits of home rule. Gladstone himself had only just edged towards the necessity of a home rule solution. More open-minded on the issue than virtually any other British politician he now felt that nothing less than home rule would solve the problem; he foresaw Ireland becoming ungovernable. Undoubtedly his memory of the Land War influenced him, as did his perception that Parnell could and would control Irish matters. Home rule was a policy fraught with not only domestic political difficulties but imperial ones as well; would India for instance use Irish home rule as a precedent for campaigning for self-government? In the spring and summer of 1885 Gladstone had appeared old and tired and it was assumed by many that Hartington would lead the Liberals in the future. To a degree revived by leaving office and by his Norwegian cruise Gladstone seems to have completed his personal conversion to home rule by the autumn. Struck by the peaceful manner by which Norway (with its own parliament and administration) coexisted with Sweden, Gladstone convinced himself of the merits of home rule as nothing less would satisfy Ireland. Gladstone’s analysis of the Norwegian precedent was simplistic if not naive. The dual monarchy of Sweden and Norway was akin to the 1782-1800 Irish model and was not a form of delegated power as envisaged in a home rule solution. Furthermore, although peaceful, the Swedish-Norwegian constitutional solution was viewed with discomfort in Norway and was not to last, Norway was to achieve complete independence within twenty years. Relations between Norway and Sweden remained strained well into the twentieth century. Hopeful that Salisbury might adopt home rule and perhaps also unsure as to whether he even wished to continue as party leader Gladstone refused in mid-November to accept Parnell’s home rule overtures. Within four days Parnell had instructed the Irish in Great Britain not to vote Liberal in the forthcoming general election. Given the information available to Parnell at the time and the propensity of many catholic Irish voters in Britain to vote Conservative due to the education issue, Parnell made the only possible choice. Temperamentally the Irish were opposed to the Liberals on both social (a perverse form of snobbery) and clerical grounds (CC O’Brien, Parnell and his Party); the Irish were more inclined to be sympathetic to the Conservatives. Though some of the home rule MPs had Liberal origins and the initiatives of Gladstone were on the whole clear, the National League was antipathic to Liberalism especially the radical non-conformity of Chamberlain. Chamberlain was loathed and distrusted by the Irish party as a whole. The 1885 election The election of November-December 1885 produced 335 Liberals, 249 Conservatives and 86 Nationalists. Liberal seats equalled the combined Conservative and Nationalist votes exactly. Parnell could keep both British parties out of office, but could put the Liberals into power. The Conservatives could govern with Irish support if Gladstone and like-minded Liberals supported Salisbury from the opposition benches. Effectively the Irish Nationalists exercised a veto for the first time ever, thus annulling the arithmetic of the Act of Union. Irish Liberal MPs had ceased to exist, the National League had even won a seat in Liverpool (TP O’Connor was to retain this until his death in 1929) and the Irish Conservatives were confined to Ulster and the two Dublin University seats. By-and-large this pattern was to remain unaltered until 1918. The results showed unionism in Ulster at its weakest with only 16 seats. This result gave the National League more seats in Ulster than the Conservatives (soon to be redesignated Unionists); the nationalist (and Gladstonian) perception of Ulster was to remain wedded to these figures, which were never again to be repeated. As discussed elsewhere these figures also fail to reveal the critical mass of Ulster Unionism, which was only just emerging as a political and moral force. Gladstone looked on the election results as a moral endorsement of home rule that could not be ignored. However Gladstone saw the election results as seemingly disastrous; he desired a clear mandate for one of the British parties. The Irish held the balance; political judgement and conscience could not be used without the accusation that politicians would be seduced by the prospect of National League support. Parnell and his party had benefited from the parliamentary reforms of 1883-5 (especially as Ireland only lost two seats despite the post-Famine falls in population). The Irish electorate more than trebled and the remaining protestant-oriented small boroughs were abolished. Democratisation was to aid both nationalism and northern unionism just as it was to continue to undermine the landed classes. Doc 7i Parnell’s discipline over his party involved a pledge being taken by all candidates before the 1885 election. “I … pledge myself that in the event of my election to parliament I will sit, act and vote with the Irish parliamentary party and if at a meeting of the party convened upon due notice specially to consider the question, it be decided by a resolution supported by a majority of the entire parliamentary party that I have not fulfilled the above pledge I hereby undertake forthwith to resign my seat.” The Hawarden Kite At the end of the general election Gladstone’s son Herbert announced in the London Standard and the Leeds Mercury his father’s conversion to home rule. This torpedoed any hope that Gladstone had of the Conservatives introducing home rule. Herbert seems to have forced his father’s hand in order to keep his father as party leader thus preventing a Chamberlain coup. Certainly Chamberlain had fought an election campaign at odds with his leader; his Unauthorised Programme had cost the Liberals some borough seats (Gladstone had written at the end of November “Fair Trade + Parnell + Church + Chamberlain have damaged us a good deal in the boroughs”), but the Liberals had gained many county seats. In reality there never had been any hope of Salisbury embracing home rule, he had previously exercised that great political gift – silence; he like Parnell at the time of the New Departure had merely kept his cards close to his chest. Salisbury’s government rejected Gladstone’s plea for a bipartisan approach; Carnarvon resigned as Lord Lieutenant and the combined Liberal and National League opposition defeated Salisbury’s government on an amendment to the Queen’s Speech put forward by Jesse Collings, Chamberlain’s henchman. Gladstone and Chamberlain Gladstone therefore returned to office at the beginning of February with a cabinet that did not contain Hartington (who was hostile to home rule and was almost as equally hostile to Chamberlain). Chamberlain took office as President of the Local Government Board despite a clear and well-known hostility to home rule. Within six weeks he and GO Trevelyan (Scottish Office) had resigned. There seems to be no doubt that Gladstone treated Chamberlain in a most cavalier fashion, airily dismissing Chamberlain’s request for the Colonial Secretaryship and subsequently snubbing him over the salary of Jesse Collings, Chamberlain’s lieutenant at the Local Government Board. Whilst it was most unlikely that Chamberlain would remain in the cabinet for long with home rule in the offing, it seems clear that Gladstone was attempting to isolate him in the party and perhaps drive him from it. To offer Chamberlain office was politically unavoidable; to drive him from office perhaps provided Gladstone with some personal satisfaction. It also meant that he then had a united cabinet with which to pursue home rule that excluded the Chamberlainite radicals. Much discussion has been made over Gladstone’s motives in pursuing home rule and his wilful alienation of Chamberlain. There is no doubt that Gladstone returned to office much revived when compared to his demeanour of the summer of 1885. Although he hoped that Salisbury would grasp the nettle of home rule, Gladstone eventually returned to office buoyed up by the prospect of a moral crusade and the aphrodisiac of power. He could moreover make a virtue of necessity and ensure that Liberalism continued to develop in his personal mode, rather than as had recently seemed likely, in a Chamberlainite manner. One does not need to subscribe fully to the Cooke and Vincent thesis that home rule was adopted for reasons of opportunism rather than conviction, but it seems that home rule (though it would be difficult to achieve) could not be pursued with an adamantly unionist Chamberlain within the cabinet. Furthermore the Liberal party had been largely created in Gladstone’s image and he was unwilling to see the party develop (or as he would have seen it – high-jacked) by a Birmingham radical to whom he was strongly antipathetic. The Home Rule and Land bills Two bills were presented to the cabinet in March: one was the home rule measure and its partner was an ambitious land purchase scheme that would (at £50m) have bought out the Irish landlords. The latter bill (which was soon dropped due to its unpopularity throughout all parts of the Commons) aimed at preventing the proposed Irish legislature from having to grapple with the land problem. Gladstone hoped that in due course the landlords, living harmoniously alongside their one-time tenants, would play a positive role in Ireland’s political and social life. The Home Rule bill was a complex measure (as one would expect from Gladstone) about which many of the bill’s supporters had reservations. The terms of the 1st Home Rule bill The bill provided for a one-chamber parliament consisting of two orders that could - if desired - vote separately; each could veto the wishes of the other order. The first order was property-based and would consist partly of Irish peers; the lower order was to fulfil the role of the Commons. The executive was to be answerable to the Irish parliament from whom it would be drawn. It was to have control of all Irish matters excepting the following specific fields: the post office, customs and excise, defence, foreign and imperial affairs, trade, navigation, coinage and the Crown. For a period of time the control of the Royal Irish Constabulary and of revenue raising would be reserved to the “imperial parliament”. One-fifteenth of the overall Westminster budget was to be chargeable to Ireland; otherwise Irish revenues were to be at the disposal of the new parliament. The tenure of Irish judges was to be the same as judges in Great Britain. Appeals from Irish courts and any questions concerning the competence of the home rule parliament were to be referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Irish representation at Westminster was to cease. Gladstone, belatedly, was prepared to reconsider this most contentious provision, but this concession was too late to save what was a moderate but deeply flawed bill. Criticisms of the bill Many considered that the bill struck at the very heart of the imperial concept and was a concession to disloyal terrorists rather than a mere form of devolution to what would have probably have been a conservative-oriented legislature and executive. Mention has been made above of the formation of the Indian Congress party and many saw Gladstone’s bill as a rash and irresponsible measure promoted by “an old man in a hurry” (Lord Randolph Churchill’s phrase). The importance of empire to most Britons, in particular the Conservatives, their supporters and much of the working class, cannot be exaggerated. There was growing identification of Britain’s worldwide maritime power with trade, industrial prowess and overseas territories. This empire on which “the sun never set” was an antidote to the European empires of the great autocracies, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany. Disraeli had formalised the Indian Empire a decade before and Britain’s annexation of African territories was well under way. Tampering with the governance of the United Kingdom was seen as a foolhardy undermining of British prestige, wealth and moral authority. The ending of Irish representation at Westminster did not fit in with the “imperial contribution”; how could the Irish parliament contribute one-fifteenth of the revenue if no Irish MPs were party to the raising and approval of the Westminster budget? This issue in particular and the lack of Irish representation in the “imperial parliament” were seen as potential levers that separatist Irishmen could exploit in the future. Protestant Britain in general, the non-conformists in particular, were worried by the catholic nature of the proposed parliament that seemed to negate the spirit of the Act of Union’s guarantee to loyal protestants. Moreover the opposition of protestant Ulster seemed to indicate that the most loyal Irishmen of all were being sacrificed to the whim of a reckless old man who had sold loyalty, Ulster and the empire for the support of the National League. Chamberlain and many others felt deeply about the Ulster issue and others such as Lord Randolph Churchill were prepared “to play the orange card” in order to thwart Gladstone. Though the bill was defeated on the floor of the Commons, Churchill’s perception of the importance of the “orange card” was astute and it was on that issue that home rule and related initiatives were to ultimately founder. Doc 7ii Gladstone, during one of the home rule debates made clear his attitude to the unionists of Ulster: “I will deviate from my path for a moment to say a word upon the state of opinion in that wealthy, intelligent and energetic portion of the Irish community which predominates in a certain portion of Ulster. Our duty is to adhere to a sound general principle, and give the utmost consideration we can to the opinion of that energetic minority. The first thing of all, I should say, is that if … violent measures have been threatened in certain emergencies, I think the best compliment I can pay to those who have threatened us is to take no notice whatever of the threats, but to treat them as momentary ebullitions … I cannot conceal the conviction that the voice of Ireland, as a whole, is at this moment clearly and constitutionally spoken. I cannot say it is otherwise when five-sixths of its lawfully chosen representatives are of one mind in this matter. Certainly, sir, I cannot allow it to be said that a Protestant minority in Ulster, or elsewhere, is to rule the question at large for Ireland. I am aware of no constitutional doctrine tolerable on which such a conclusion could be adopted or justified. But I think that the Protestant minority should have its wishes considered to the utmost practical extent in any form that they may assume.” Doc 7iii AV Dicey, the leading English Jurist of the day was opposed to home rule, despite his sympathy for Irish nationalism and Liberalism. His opposition had much in common to that of John Bright’s. “Home Rule does not mean National Independence … A nation is one thing, a state forming part of a federation is quite another …A bona fide Home Ruler cannot be a bona fide Nationalist … In America or in Switzerland federalism has developed because existing states wished to be combined into some kind of national unity. Federalism in England [sic] would necessarily mean the breaking up of a nation in order to form a body of states … The vast majority of the United Kingdom, including a million or more of the inhabitants of Ireland, have expressed their will to maintain the Union. Popular government means government in accordance with the will of the majority, and therefore according to all the principles of popular government the majority of the United Kingdom have a right to maintain the Union. Their wish is decisive, and ought to terminate the whole agitation in favour of Home Rule … The principle that the will of the majority should be sovereign cannot … be invoked to determine a dispute turning upon the enquiry which of two bodies is the body the majority of which has sovereignty.” Unionist responses in Ireland Irish unionist responses to the home rule phenomenon were piecemeal; like everyone else unionists were taken by surprise by Gladstone’s “sudden” conversion to home rule. For the one and only time the southern three provinces stole a march on Ulster and produced an anti-home rule initiative at a relatively early stage. In May 1885 the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union was founded by Lord Ranfurly as a non-sectarian and cross-party body. Largely ineffective, especially as neither party had declared its true colours until after the general election, it was a landlord-oriented body. Although extremely active in producing and distributing leaflets, in the final analysis the ILPU could not hope to make an electoral impact in the National League-dominated south. It could however optimise support amongst the establishment in Great Britain. In Ulster little coordination and cooperation took place before the 1885 election, as there was little love lost between the fairly complacent Liberals, Conservatives and the Orangemen, who fought each other and the National League in the election. This helps explain the home rulers’ success in winning 17 seats. The shock of this coupled with Gladstone’s conversion led to the setting up of the Conservative-dominated Ulster Loyal Anti-Repeal Union, which then made common cause with the protestant churches and the Orange Order. Having forged links with Lord Randolph Churchill at the Ulster Hall in February, further links were developed with the Ulster Liberals in April, who formed their own Ulster Liberal Unionist Committee shortly before the bill’s defeat in June. Though ponderously slow to organise, the energy and intensity that were aroused eclipsed the anti-home rule passion that was developing in Great Britain and the other parts of Ireland. A foretaste of things to come (i.e. in 1892 and 1912) was the placing of advertisements in the Belfast Newsletter for weapons and drill instructors. Rumours circulated concerning an Ulster army as well as there being willing and active support from within the British Army. Though there were some instances of men drilling, the rumours were largely an instance of the Irish art of political theatre. Nevertheless that some such instances did occur is illustrative of the intensity of Ulster unionist feeling at the time and a warning to anyone willing to observe the emergence of the Ulster question. Liberal opposition to the bill There was an anti-Irish and sectarian opposition to the bill in Great Britain, though this was not the main tenor of opposition within the Commons; that revolved round the end of Irish representation, the financial clauses, the Ulster and imperial issues. There was also much comment on the precipitate nature of the legislation and Gladstone’s open conversion to home rule after the election. His moral righteousness and self-absorbed arrogance failed to win friends for what he had originally hoped would be a non-partisan measure to which both parliament and the electorate could be won over in time. Harcourt, the Leader of the Commons and a loyal follower of Gladstone, still commented on the GOM’s “criminal lunacy”; not only the Conservatives therefore perceived that Gladstone was “an old man in a hurry”. Whether it was his crusading zeal or selfish political calculation that alienated the Whig and Chamberlainite polarities within the Liberals, the parliamentary party was trimmed down to a Gladstonian rump. Few amongst his loyal supporters shared his faith in home rule and many had severe reservations as to the practicalities of the bill. Even if we accept Gladstone’s contention that Irish representation at Westminster should end so that the new Dublin parliament had the unequivocal and undivided attention of its members, one must conclude that Gladstone, and more especially his supporters, were tempted by the blessed release Westminster would obtain from not having to deal with Irish legislation, National League obstruction and ‘foul Irish Tories’. Chamberlain and Bright Parnell and his colleagues saw Chamberlain as the man who killed home rule. Such perception was an understandable reaction given Chamberlain’s low status amongst Irish Nationalists who were unable to forgive him for showing such a strong and apparently constructive interest in Irish affairs and yet being implacably hostile to Home Rule. Chamberlain was the most vocal spokesman for what became known as Liberal Unionism but it would seem unlikely that he carried with him more than his own coterie of Birmingham radicals. Parnell was probably guilty of hyperbole by describing Chamberlain as “the man who killed home rule”, as other radicals and of course the Whigs made up their own minds, convinced of the inappropriateness of the principle of home rule and the folly of Gladstone’s particular bill. Seldom damned or given the credit normally reserved for Chamberlain is John Bright, who was far more influential in the party as a whole than Chamberlain. Bright was a radical whose prestige within Liberalism far eclipsed that of Chamberlain, the brilliant but abrasive young man in a hurry. Of the 93 Liberals who voted against the second reading those who followed Bright’s lead together with the Whigs were probably more influential than the relatively unpopular Chamberlain. Chamberlain is unlikely to have accounted for as many as 30 votes, the number by which the bill was defeated in the Commons. Doc 7iv John Bright recorded the following in his diary of 20 March, 1886: “Downing Street. Long interview for 2 hours with Mr Gladstone at his request … He explained much of his policy as to a Dublin Parlt and as to Land Purchase. I objected to the Land policy as unnecessary … As to a Dublin Parlt I argued that he was making a surrender all along the line. A Dublin Parlt would work with constant friction, and would press against any barrier he might create to keep up the unity of the 3 Kingdoms. What of a volunteer force, and what of import duties and protection as against British goods? He would not object, but any armed force must be under officers appointed by the Crown; and he did not think duties as against England would be imposed. Mr G. is in favour of excluding all Irish representation from the Imperial Parlt. Thinks Irish members in Dublin and at Westminster not possible. Irish members think they could not supply representatives for both Houses. I told him I thought to get rid of the Irishmen from Westminster, such as we have known them for 5 or 6 years past, would do something to make his propositions less offensive and distasteful in Gt. Britain, tho’ it tends to more complete separation … I thought he placed far too much confidence in the leaders of the Rebel Party. I could place none in them, and the general feeling was and is that any terms made with them would not be kept, and that, thro’ them, I could not hope for reconciliation with discontented and disloyal Ireland.” The Home Rule bill in the Commons The bill had started its passage through the Commons in early April and was introduced by Gladstone. He spoke of the will of the Irish nation, the mandate of five-sixths of its MPs and the view that Irish patriotism and imperial patriotism were not mutually exclusive. He appealed to the Commons: “Think, I beseech you; think well, think wisely, think not for the moment, but for the years that are to come before you reject this bill”. Despite initial reservations and some wrangling over its financial provisions Parnell accepted the bill “as a final settlement for our national question and I believe the Irish people will accept it”. He had wanted control of customs and excise and had reservations about the financial provisions in general; nevertheless he and his party accepted the measure in good faith. He was also aware that “no man has a right to fix the boundary to the march of a nation. No man has right to say to his country – thus far shalt thou go and no further”. His ne plus ultra speech of January 1885 was an axiomic statement of political reality that did not lessen the fact that he – essentially conservative – accepted Gladstone’s bill; it was more than he could have hoped for from a great imperial power. During the protracted second reading in May and June, Liberals and unionists rallied support: Liberal MPs coalesced behind Gladstone or the Union; the Ulster Liberal Unionist Committee came into being. In Belfast protestant mobs vented their anger and (after the defeat of the bill) their triumph against the catholic population and the RIC. The half-century old tradition of sectarian violence was reasserting itself in a society that was beginning to define itself under the shadow and – for many – the threat of home rule. A realignment of politics Following the defeat of the bill by 341 to 311 votes on 8 June, parliament was dissolved. A fundamental realignment of British politics was already under way that would be confirmed in the July general election. From then until the formation of Asquith’s coalition government in 1915 home rule was to dominate the political divide; in fact Ireland was to feature prominently for the following six years as well. The 1886 election produced 300 Conservatives; 191 Liberals; 75 Liberal Unionists and 1 Irish Nationalist in Great Britain. In Ireland 84 Nationalists; 17 Unionists and 2 Liberal Unionists were elected. Of these 15 Unionists (technically one was a Conservative) were from Ulster and two from Dublin University. To all intents and purposes two groupings had come about; one unionist (Conservative and Liberal Unionist) who did not oppose each other at the election and a home rule grouping of Gladstonian Liberals and National League MPs. Lord Salisbury formed a Conservative government, which was on occasion supported by Hartington, Chamberlain and the Liberal Unionists from the opposition benches. Salisbury’s government announced twenty years of resolute government for Ireland. Overall government conciliation probably outbalanced confrontation, though invariably the Irish national movement was able to monopolise and exploit propaganda and publicity to the full by dwelling on the coercive aspects of the government. Overall, despite constructive measures and resolute government these were years of retreat for the Union, largely Unionist governments failed to control the political agenda. Gladstonian Liberalism became largely confined to the Celtic fringes; only in the 1906 landslide did the Liberals really reassert themselves in England. Willy-nilly Gladstone’s party was bound to home rule, no other issues really concerned the leadership and the demography of politics meant that the party was dependent on National League support. Likewise Parnell no longer had the freedom of political movement he had enjoyed in 1885; he was wedded to Gladstone’s party. Though the positive side of this can be seen in Gladstone’s fêting of Parnell at Hawarden in 1889, the negative side can be seen in 1890 and 1891 when the Liberals insisted that the price for home rule was the resignation of Parnell as leader. The Gladstonian enigma What had Gladstone been attempting by introducing the first Home Rule bill? He was stimulated undoubtedly by the heady combination of power and a campaign on behalf of a just cause. It may well be that the chase was more alluring than the kill. What chance had he of educating his own party? Without doubt he was “bounced” by the Hawarden kite into openly advocating home rule; however in 1886 his manner showed no desire to educate or conciliate. Was it the reckless zeal of the convert to whom everything was crystal-clear; or was it the autocratic and selfish approach of the older leader who was unwilling or unable to envisage a Liberal party with new leaders and new goals? His personal espousal of home rule was no different from his action as a staunch anglican advocating disestablishment. That however fitted in with party political advantage, his behaviour in 1886 did not. He, rather than Chamberlain, Hartington and Bright split the Liberals; he shunted the party into a political cul-de-sac from which it never recovered. Did he put the future of the Irish and British nations before party? – “Think, I beseech you … think not for the moment but for the years that are to come …” Or did he recklessly condemn the Liberals to a political impossibility that meant the exclusion of Joseph Chamberlain and (for Gladstone) unwelcome social reform? His cavalier treatment of Chamberlain, the Ulster Liberals and others show a self-absorbed arrogance compatible with a moral crusade, personal selfishness or both. What is clear is that a rushed and deeply flawed bill had little chance of passing the Commons and no chance of passing the Conservative-dominated Lords. Was Gladstone’s espousal of home rule a brave long-term undertaking, a constitutional experiment in the great laboratory of nineteenth century Ireland that might provide the excuse for major House of Lords reform? Or was it a deliberate charade to which a seventy-five year old doomed his party? The Plan of Campaign Towards the end of 1886 William O’Brien and John Dillon initiated the “Plan of Campaign” in response to another agricultural crisis; Salisbury’s government failed to respond to the situation, the judicial rents set in 1882 were beyond the capacity of the poorer tenants. O’Brien suggested that in the event of a landlord refusing a rent reduction his tenants were to offer a “fair” rent. If these rents were refused the payments were to be placed in an “estate fund” to support the tenants involved. Moreover the National League was to make up any shortfalls in the estate funds. Although the “Plan” was embraced by a number of Parnell’s activists, he himself was not keen. Parnell’s attitude was similar to his approach to the No Rent Manifesto (which was also the work of O’Brien) that was launched by his colleagues in Kilmainham in late 1881. Both initiatives were made without his approval, they smacked of extremism on occasions when he wanted to foster relations with the Liberals. In 1882 he had signed the Manifesto with some cynicism as there was no longer much need to pursue an extremist line, similarly in 1886/7 alienation of the Liberals might have destroyed any hope of developing the home rule alliance further. At his secret meeting with O’Brien in London in December 1886 he stressed that the “Plan” should not be extended to any more estates and that the whole venture was fraught with risk. By-and-large his reservations were well founded as the Conservatives opposed the “Plan” with vigour; National League resources were drained in support of the various estate funds; moreover the “Plan” remained limited to Connacht and the poorer parts of Munster. The old Land League may have been most active in those self-same areas but it did have a wider constituency and did have followers amongst the other strata of rural Ireland. The “Plan” was met by landlord opposition and government resolution. Salisbury’s nephew, Arthur Balfour was appointed Chief Secretary in the spring of 1887 and in the autumn three were shot by the RIC during a disturbance at Mitchelstown, County Cork. With the nationalist genius for effective political publicity this became known as the Mitchelstown Massacre and the Chief Secretary earned the nickname “Bloody Balfour”. Meanwhile a new “perpetual” coercion law was introduced. In the latter part of 1886 and for much of 1887 little was seen or heard of Parnell: poor health and cohabitation with Katherine O’Shea in part accounted for his low profile; additionally however his dislike of the “Plan” explained some of his absences from public life. Ironically Parnell’s avoidance of the limelight helped enhance his reputation as a man of mystery together with his aura of inscrutability. Liberal and Conservative views on the land issue The Liberal opposition made much of Balfour’s tough and uncompromising policy. For some time significant elements of Liberal opinion had become convinced of the iniquity of Irish land holding and believed in the commonly held nationalist proposition that a free Gaelic peasantry had been dispossessed by the English conquerors. This widely held piece of race-guilt, assiduously fostered by nationalists, went a long way towards undermining the will to rule in Ireland. The Conservatives on the other hand still believed in the concept of the Union and their sporadic attempts to “kill Home Rule by kindness” led to a £5m supplement to the 1885 Ashbourne Act. The Balfour Land Act and the setting-up of the Congested Districts Board of 1891 were constructive efforts by Arthur Balfour to solve the continuing problems of the land and rural underdevelopment especially in the still densely populated west. Although both at the time and more recently there has been criticism of the efficacy of the Congested Districts Board and its workings it was one of the major government initiatives in MacDonagh’s social laboratory of nineteenth century Ireland. Ironically such constructive Conservative efforts to ameliorate the land problem and reinforce the Union meant that the increasingly attractive nature of the land-purchase acts enabled a proportion of the Anglo-Irish landed classes to begin to disassociate themselves from Irish affairs; in the long-term as they were bought out so their stake in Ireland was reduced. Although the Plan of Campaign was strongly resisted its long-drawn out nature started to sap the will of the traditional ruling class. In their different ways the British political parties started to fulfil Lalor’s formula even though Parnell after 1881/2 (as opposed to his activists) saw the land issue as a dangerous red herring that would detract from the goal of home rule. The Times and the Special Commission on Crime Within weeks of Balfour becoming Chief Secretary and during the passage of the coercion bill through parliament The Times started publishing a series of articles on “Parnellism and Crime”. These claimed that Parnell had links with terrorism, that he had been linked to Land League excesses and that he had condoned the Phoenix Park murders. The Times even published a facsimile of Parnell’s supposed letter expressing regret at having to condemn the murders. Parnell denounced the letter as a forgery and later requested that a Select Committee of the House of Commons should be set up to investigate the whole issue. Moreover he suggested that the committee should not contain any Irish MPs and that it should subpoena witnesses. The government ignored Parnell’s demand but instead set up a special commission to investigate all Irish nationalist and land activities of the previous years. Effectively Parnell, Davitt and Irish nationalism were on trial, the Attorney General’s involvement (ostensibly as counsel for The Times) indicated the degree to which the government was involved as a less than impartial participant. The Commission which sat during late 1888 and virtually the whole of 1889 certainly revealed the obvious, that was that there were various links between Parnell and the Fenians and moreover it also suited the leadership to raise the political temperature during the Land War whilst indulging in brinkmanship. According to evidence submitted to the Commission Parnell had stated to an American journalist “A true revolutionary movement in Ireland should, in my opinion, partake of both a constitutional and an illegal character”. This duality of approach characterises the twin-track nature of Irish nationalism that could seldom be classified as purely revolutionary or solely constitutional. The various letters implicating Parnell’s approval of the Phoenix Park murders and criminal conspiracy were shown to be forgeries. Though some of the evidence was embarrassing to Parnell the parliamentary ally of the Liberals, he appeared to emerge vindicated and a hero in Gladstonian circles. In the opinion of Richard Shannon (Gladstone: Heroic Minister 1865-1898) Gladstone had arrived at “an increasingly blind trust”. Parnell was entertained by Gladstone at Hawarden and the home rule alliance seemed well and truly cemented. Furthermore the government and The Times were discredited and shown to be virtually guilty of conspiracy or at the very least insufficiently scrupulous in accepting and weighing evidence. There seemed to be a prospect in the not too distant future of Gladstone returning to office in close alliance with Parnell’s home rulers. 8. THE LEGACY OF PARNELL: HIS FALL AND THE CREATION OF A MYTH Parnell’s relationship with Katherine O’Shea Parnell became the hero of Liberal Britain following the exposure of the Pigott forgeries in early 1889. In December he was Gladstone’s guest but within a week William O’Shea had filed a petition for divorce on the grounds of his wife’s adultery with Parnell. In political circles the Parnell-O’Shea liaison had been common knowledge for some years; in fact the Pall Mall Gazette had indicated as early as May 1886 that Parnell was living at Mrs O’Shea’s house. Although unknown by the public at the time Captain O’Shea acquiesced in his wife’s relationship with his party leader. He had originally encouraged their relationship in order to further his own political career, it is quite possible however that he did not envisage that their friendship would develop to the extent that it did. What is now clear is that he tolerated Parnell’s fathering of three children (of which the first died at the time of the Kilmainham negotiations) on the grounds of the furtherance of his own political ambitions and in the hope of benefiting from the will of Katherine’s wealthy aunt. Katherine also kept up some appearances of normal married life in order to receive her aunt’s legacy. Mrs Wood did not die until the summer of 1889 at the age of 96. This was obviously longer than any of the parties involved would have envisaged; to O’Shea’s chagrin he was excluded from the will. This may well account for his citing of Parnell as co-respondent in December 1889. His political ambitions had effectively ended in the summer of 1886 and with the dashing of his financial hopes the time appeared right for the ending of the eight or nine year old pretence of marriage. For his part Parnell had been prepared to resort to subterfuge in order to keep up some form of public and private appearance, but once O’Shea sued for divorce he was not going to contest the matter. He and Katherine wished to be married and to regularise their relationship. He assured political colleagues and allies that he would emerge from the situation with his character unblemished. Perhaps this was due to his belief that Katherine and he were truly man and wife and he had nothing to be ashamed of; additionally his supreme arrogance (and his increasing remoteness from reality) indicated that he was answerable to no man. When the divorce came to trial in November 1890 it became clear that Parnell’s reputation would not remain unsullied; his party however remained supportive. In Irish circles only Davitt advised temporary retirement, even the catholic Archbishop of Dublin advised silence pending the decision of the Irish Parliamentary Party. Initially the IPP unanimously re-elected Parnell as their leader and chairman. The Liberal response On the same day however Gladstone, on the advice of John Morley, announced that he could not continue as the Liberal leader whilst Parnell remained at the head of the IPP. Liberal nonconformity had served notice on Gladstone that it would not tolerate an alliance with an adulterer. Adultery was by no means rare in Victorian society, the Prince of Wales had been a witness in a divorce suit in 1870, but had not been cited as co-respondent. A veil of respectability had just been maintained. Sir Charles Dilke, a Liberal contemporary of Parnell (and a potential successor to Gladstone) had been defeated in 1886 and had to withdraw from parliament for some years, having been involved in a sensational divorce case. Non-conformist morality, middle class respectability and the views of Queen Victoria all created an atmosphere in which sexual shenanigans were tolerated provided they did not become matters of public scandal or debate. Once brought to law, whether civil (Dilke and Parnell) or criminal (Oscar Wilde – another Irishman) scandal and public disgrace were generally inevitable. In the circumstances Gladstone indicated that the National League had to choose between Parnell and the continuation of the Liberal alliance and the prospect of home rule. Parnell then publicly denounced Gladstone and the Liberals for undermining the independence of the IPP. It could be argued that the events of summer 1886 had destroyed the independence of the nationalists and that both they and the Liberals were mutually dependent on the development and preservation of the home rule front. This was what most of the IPP thought - they split: 28 MPs remained loyal to Parnell and 45 withdrew their support following their marathon debates in Committee Room 15 at Westminster that occupied the best part of a week at the beginning of December 1890. The death of Parnell and divisions in the party There then followed an acrimonious period of in-fighting that continued well beyond Parnell’s death in the autumn of 1891. In fact the party split lasted until 1900, by which time new political forces were developing. The bitterness of the quarrel was fuelled by the catholic church’s denunciation of Parnell; by Parnell’s increasingly wild statements and by the pent-up frustration of Parnell’s most able lieutenants who had been silently chafing at “the Chief’s” increasingly remote and autocratic methods of leadership. Only once previously had his colleagues mutinied; this had been in February 1886 at the Galway by-election when Parnell had insisted on the adoption of William O’Shea, though unpledged, against a popular National League local candidate. Parnell eventually got his way and the party went away with much muttering and shaking of heads. The Parnell-O’Shea affair might then have become a public issue, as it was pretty clear to Parnell’s colleagues why such an unsuitable candidate was being pushed forward. The mutineers were vindicated when William O’Shea failed to vote for the home rule bill in the summer of 1886. In the ten months that followed the famous Committee Room 15 debate by the Parliamentary Party and Parnell’s death in October 1891, the Parnellites lost all three of the by-elections whose meetings often degenerated into violence. Parnellism did retain some support in Dublin and the larger towns but in rural constituencies including those in Ulster Parnellites were defeated in the 1892 general election (71 Anti-Parnellites and only 9 Parnellites were elected). Therefore within eighteen months of the parliamentary party’s split the electoral tide had turned even more decisively against the Parnellites. Parnell’s death completely changed Irish politics and was to have a major impact on the British political scene for the next 30 years. Parnell’s achievements were fourfold: He made the British political parties take Ireland and home rule seriously; in fact he provided Gladstone with a political mission and obsession that excluded all others. He gave Irish nationalism a modern political machine that provided discipline and efficiency to what was essentially an alliance of interests and competing egos. In some ways the Irish Parliamentary Party showed more maturity than the Liberals in being prepared to ditch its leader, whereas the Liberals were unwilling or unable to move on from Gladstone to a more progressive leader. The myth of his fall and death was probably as significant as his actual political career. This was to provide part of the motive force of nationalist politics during the next 30 years. It is about this ‘achievement’ that this chapter is mainly concerned. (This is not to say that the fall/betrayal of “the Chief” was the sole or even in some instances the most important reason for new forces coming into play.) Parnell was able to create an alliance and understanding with the catholic church that made the Irish National League the spokesbody for the church on matters such as education. This put the weight of the hierarchy and priesthood behind the nationalist party machine. Hitherto the church’s attitude had been equivocal, it had supported Irish national aspirations in a general sense but had shied away from committed support as it had feared the revolutionary (and in some cases anti-clerical) nature of Irish nationalism. The young men of the 1890s felt betrayed by the home rule party’s rejection of Parnell in favour of that of the Liberal alliance. They saw this as a betrayal of both ‘the Chief’ and the national cause for a corrupt alliance with the English establishment. In fact as the INL had chosen to work through the parliamentary system this was illogical as only with the support of a major British political party (the Liberals) could home rule ever become law. Parnell had opted for parliamentary politics throughout his career (though the ‘New Departure’ had involved an accommodation with Fenians but on his terms rather than theirs). Apart from the period of the 1890/91 party split when he had appeared to flirt with the ‘hillside men’, (i.e. those with an extreme outlook) he had stayed within the framework of constitutionalism. This view has been challenged by Frank Callanan (The Parnell Split) who sees a continuity between the radical Parnell of the Land War and the embattled figure of 1891. The young men of the ’nineties tended to remember the Parnell of the last months, the apparent extremist rather than the calculating parliamentarian. Therefore some potential INL recruits were alienated from constitutional politics and were attracted to the IRB, Sinn Fein or the catalytic cultural movements: GAA, the Gaelic League and the Irish Literary Movement. The Gaelic Athletic Association The Gaelic Athletic Association was founded in 1884 by Michael Cusack and provided a disciplined non-British physical environment that was to be of military value to the IRB as well as an attractive recruiting ground for the rural youth of catholic Ireland. The GAA fulfilled much the same role as the gymnastic movement in Germany earlier in the century, combining national commitment with physical training and recreation. Archbishop Croke of Cashel became a patron, indicating a post-Cullen tendency for members of the hierarchy to become involved in nationalist political matters. The organisation was significant as it was one of the few grounds where the church and IRB were able to meet and jointly influence young men. This is not to say that they always saw eye to eye – for instance Parnell’s coffin was escorted by an element carrying hurley sticks whose attitude was not approved by the church. Although the IRB established a hold on the GAA’s leadership in 1887, the National League was also prominent in the movement; Parnell was a patron as was Davitt. It would be too simplistic to see the GAA and the other cultural movements as wholly antagonistic to home rule politics. The GAA’s “advanced” political approach was not incompatible with an ability to work with home rulers; that, after all, had been the unofficial Fenian approach since the days of the New Departure and the Land League. Moreover even after the split in the home rule party the GAA acted as a forum where advanced nationalists, Parnellites, anti-Parnellites and the apolitical could meet. This ability to act as a bridge or catalyst was in the long run to be a vital element in the radicalisation of Irish politics. The GAA operated a ban on its members playing ‘saxon’ sports or associating with members of the Crown Forces (i.e. the Army and RIC), thus showing its obvious separatist and extreme nationalistic aspirations. Such an organisation proved to be a useful front for the IRB, very many of the IRA of the 1916-23 period were GAA members and had imbibed part at least of their revolutionary views through this organisation. Often such radicalisation came from more than one source, not just physical, but also cultural and political. This was also instanced in the emerging labour circles of Britain at the time, many activists evolved and were educated by passing through different organisations such as the SDF and the Fabians. The younger activists received the Parnell myth at second hand – they themselves being too young to remember the Parnell of the ’80s or even in some cases the tragic and increasingly irrational figure of the 1890/91 period. The Gaelic League The Gaelic League was created as a non-political movement to explore and develop the Irish language and its culture. This started as a genuinely non-political movement patronised amongst others by upper and middle class protestants. In time it became a vehicle for Sinn Fein and IRB, it became a vehicle for ultra-nationalist views and politics. It had a wide following among schoolmasters and clerks, who were to play such a significant part in the Irish revolution of the early twentieth century. Douglas Hyde, its apolitical founder, resigned in 1915 due to its politicisation. In fact Hyde was naive in not perceiving that the Gaelic League would become an important vehicle for expressing national political identity. Cultural identity could not be separated from nationalism and separatism. Though at times organisations such as the Gaelic League could be politically exclusive, the League like all (except TD Moran’s “Irish Ireland”) the movements could act as a forum for those with a variety of political goals and those with none who were merely interested in the cultural or recreational aspects. (As late as 1892 Ulster Unionists were prepared to use an Irish language slogan above the front of their Convention building at Belfast’s Botanic Gardens. Within a very few years Irish would be considered as an exclusively nationalist, if not advanced nationalist medium and vehicle; the language would become an anathema to unionists.) The Anglo-Irish Literary movement Unlike the Gaelic League the Anglo-Irish Literary renaissance used English as its medium but by-and-large dealt with traditional Gaelic and quasi-Gaelic themes. Yeats, Synge and ‘AE’ Russell were the leading figures, writing under the patronage of Lady Gregory. Their impact through the Abbey Theatre and their writings was immense although not always in harmony with the other political and cultural forces active at the time. Yeats saw the movement as inclusive and outward looking, distinctly Irish but part of the general culture of Europe. Yeats had helped create a national theatre, but there was an ambiguity not least in his own mind – was it a nationalist theatre? Ultimately the wider horizons of Yeats and Synge were to clash with the narrow ideals of the Gaelic catholic revolution, which contrasted the piety of the “noble peasant” with the corrupt and materialistic world to all things English. Yeats’s play Cathleen ni Houlihan (1902) had a tremendous impact on the ‘angry young men’ of the post-Parnell generation some of whom were already disillusioned with parliamentary politics and imbued with cultural nationalism. The play was a summons to rebellion; in fact it stressed the role of sacrifice for Ireland. It had the impact of religious ecstasy on its audiences i.e.: - “a sort of gospel”, “a sort of sacrament”. Yeats, despite being a member of the IRB since perhaps 1887, eventually recoiled from what he had created – the Frankenstein-type monster of the blood sacrifice; hence in one of his last poems he wrote: “…did that play of mine send out certain men the English shot?” Certainly the 1916 Rising was partly conceived as a blood sacrifice, the timing was significant (Easter); however the concept of the purifying nature of death and blood was stressed by a number of writers and political figures in the pre- and early War years throughout Europe. Linked to the concept of theoretical rebellion, sacrifice and example was the actuality of the Boer War. Some Irishmen volunteered to fight for the Boers, obtained military experience and helped show that the British Empire was not invincible. Conor Cruise O’Brien has emphasised the importance of the Boer War in promoting the concept of physical force. Irish Brigades fought for the Boer republics and Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn Fein published a pro-Boer newspaper in South Africa before returning to Ireland to start his political movement. The contrast between Ulster’s imperial attitude towards the war and that of lukewarm attitudes in the south to official recruitment together with the pro-Boer attitudes mentioned above were very significant and should be borne in mind when contrasting North and South and the growing divisions between the two parts of Ireland. Sinn Fein Griffith, although inspired by the Parnell myth, was never a republican revolutionary, nor was the pre-1917 Sinn Fein the extremist organisation that the British supposed it to be. Griffith was certainly disillusioned by the actions of the existing parliamentarians and the Westminster system. His solution was based on the 1866 Austro-Hungarian model, that of a Dual Monarchy, i.e. a union that would be replaced by two co-equal parliaments (Great Britain and Ireland) each with its own executive. The only common link was to be that of the Crown. Such an oddball scheme found few permanent supporters and Sinn Fein only prospered due to the authorities treating it as an extreme revolutionary movement. It was also a temporary haven for protest voters alienated from home rule politics. In fact the Sinn Fein programme was a glorified form of home rule that fell well short of true independence. Passive resistance rather than violent revolution was preached. Griffith advocated a withdrawal of Irish MPs from Westminster and a boycotting of British institutions much as the Hungarians had done in 1866. Griffith’s economic policy was based on protection and self-sufficiency which were of course unacceptable to both tariff reformers and free traders in Britain. Griffith was perhaps the political figure most influenced by the fall of Parnell, he hero-worshipped the man and was instrumental in developing the myth of the dead hero. He also drew on the inclusive and fairly advanced political romanticism of the Young Irelanders of the 1840s. A cultural nationalist and a catholic he came close to advocating an exclusively Gaelic or catholic Ireland. (He was on moral and ideological grounds prepared to stress the purity of catholic and native virtue and condemn Yeats and Synge together with the Abbey Theatre at the time of the celebrated production of Playboy of the Western World.) He saw himself as an enabler of an inclusive nationalism, which he promoted through his newspaper (United Irishman). His emphasis – as could be deduced from the title of the newspaper was unity, he therefore advocated strategies that called for a “minimum of agreement,” thus enabling maximum political cooperation and the development of a pan-nationalist front. Despite the title “United Irishman” he was critical of the ’98 rebellion as it precipitated the end of the College Green parliament and the coming of the Act of Union. His movement, Sinn Fein (meaning “ourselves”) advocated equality between Great Britain and Ireland, linked only by the Crown. However his own political solution was of far less importance than his inclusive and eclectic willingness, advocated through his newspapers (firstly the United Irishman and then Sinn Fein) to work with others. This belief in the development of a broad political front explains why when circumstances made Sinn Fein a refuge for the politically disillusioned in 1908 and 1917, he was willing for his movement to be utilised by others. Griffith was prepared, when the occasion demanded, to be self-effacing as in 1917 when he took second place to deValera or in 1922 when he was eclipsed by Collins. The Home Rule party (1) But what of the Irish National League – split by Parnell and the O’Shea divorce case? The attitude of the “angry young men” was not just due to the betrayal of “the Chief” by his parliamentary colleagues, it was also a product of frustration at the fact that the IPP not only split into Parnellites and anti-Parnellites, but subsequently into three and then four factions. Much nationalist energy was dissipated during the ’90s by the in-fighting between the various groups. Not only did it enable the Unionists to maximise their seats in Ulster but also for some young activists it revealed a moral bankruptcy characterised by personal vested interests, vanity and egotism. The splits were inevitable given the departure of the autocratic Parnell; the land-oriented and church-oriented factions tended to pull in separate directions and this was exacerbated by the strong personalities of John Dillon and Tim Healy respectively. John Redmond, the leader of the Parnellite faction, was a more ameliorative figure who tended to find common ground with others, perhaps due to an instinct based on Parnell’s post-1882 approach. It is no coincidence that it was under Redmond that the home rulers reunited in 1900 as the United Irish League. The movement was set back by the defeat of the 1893 Home Rule bill (the 1886 bill had created a sort of optimism based on the very clear alliance between the National League and the Gladstonian Liberals; 1893 on the other hand seemed to bring out a feeling of humiliation and pessimism). 1893 showed clearly that Gladstone had failed (and was finished) and that home rule seemed to be little more than a pipe-dream given the crushing nature of the bill’s defeat in the Lords and the obvious lack of enthusiasm for home rule amongst Rosebery, Harcourt and the other post-Gladstonian Liberals. The 2nd Home Rule Bill The Liberals won the general election of July 1892. In Great Britain they obtained 272 seats; the Conservatives had 249 and the Liberal Unionists 42; there was also TP O’Connor sitting as a nationalist in Liverpool. In Ireland the nationalists obtained 80 seats (71 anti-Parnellites; 9 Parnellites); there were also 19 Unionists and 4 Liberal Unionists. Gladstone became Prime Minister in mid-August for the fourth and last time. In February of the following year he introduced the second Home Rule bill to the Commons. The new bill took into account the issue of continued Irish representation at Westminster: 80 Irish seats were to be retained; it was proposed that these MPs would only be permitted to vote on Irish and imperial matters. It was explicitly stated that Westminster would remain sovereign; no provision was however made for Ulster. The new parliament would consist of a council of 48 members and a lower house of 103 members representing the existing Westminster constituencies (Irish representation had been reduced from 105 to 103 in the 1885 Redistribution of Seats Act). Whilst the “no taxation without representation” issue had been addressed, the possibility of Irish sabotage on imperial or defence issues had been raised. Ulster moreover remained a major stumbling block and was becoming the major line of Unionist opposition to the bill. The bill’s passage through the Commons was protracted, taking up 85 sittings. Of the bill’s supporters Gladstone and Redmond were the most eloquent (Redmond’s performance certainly helped his eventual rise to the leadership of the nationalists). Chamberlain was the most incisive of the bill’s critics. It passed its third reading in early September by 34 votes; Gladstone realised at the time that this was an insufficient margin with which to take on the Lords on moral and constitutional grounds. Within a week the House of Lords had decisively rejected the bill by 419 to 41 votes. The Duke of Devonshire (the one-time Hartington) led the opposition to the bill, thus the Liberal Unionists had been amongst the most active in the opposition to the bill in both houses of parliament. Gladstone’s instinct was to ask for a dissolution so as to fight an election. His colleagues advised him that public opinion was more concerned that the Liberals should implement the Newcastle programme. Given the massive Unionist majority in the Lords it would have taken a huge mobilisation of public opinion to bring about constitutional change. The public at large were hostile or indifferent to home rule; if there was a demand for Liberal policy it was for radical social reform, if the Liberals had won the 1892 election on a particular platform it was the Newcastle programme and not home rule or reform of the upper chamber. Little was achieved in Gladstone’s last five months of office; on his resignation he was replaced by Lord Rosebery (Victoria’s choice), whose attitude towards home rule was less than enthusiastic. He was however realistic as he pointed out that no granting of home rule could take place until England had been convinced of its merits. In June 1895 Salisbury took office for the third time, in the following month this was confirmed in the general election: the unionists (Conservatives and Liberal Unionists) obtaining 411 seats; the Liberals lost nearly a hundred seats and the nationalists (of whatever type) won 82. The Liberals had taken a beating and had been pushed back to the Celtic fringes; home rule was well and truly off the political agenda for the foreseeable future. The Home Rule party (2) Nevertheless the home rule movement of the late ’90s in some ways constituted a more sober and mature series of groupings than previously; they then reunited at the end of January 1900. They had experienced the euphoria of 1886, the doldrums of 1891 and 1893 and they had maintained a strong opposition to Unionist initiatives throughout the late ’90s and the early twentieth century that generally over-rode their internal divisions. This was partly in opposition to the no-nonsense stance of Salisbury’s governments and partly due to a fear that positive Unionist measures would seduce voters away from the nationalist cause (see John Dillon’s reaction to the Wyndham Land Purchase Act of 1903, below). In fact the virulence of such opposition – as Alvin Jackson pointed out in Ireland 1798–1998 together with the home rulers’ abusive critique of British rule revealed a “fatal inconsistency within party strategy”; the movement was, whether it liked it or not, dependant on Liberal goodwill and the need to work within the British constitutional apparatus and yet it snubbed and vilified the British administrative machine and various political overtures. It was biting the hand that – occasionally – attempted to feed it. In Jackson’s words “the Irish Parliamentary Party had thus taken a steam-hammer to the superficially impressive shell of the British administration in Ireland; but it was Sinn Fein that picked up the kernel”. The reunited party of the early twentieth century was a shadow of the party under Parnell. Apart from the trauma of the split it suffered from not having a leader of status or calibre; Redmond led the party because he was relatively acceptable to all and was not particularly dominant, he had still to contend with stronger characters such as Dillon, who on occasion pursued a factional line. Essentially Redmond was a trimmer and the party meandered through a series of ultimately directionless initiatives that were not fully coherent. Redmond operated from a position of weakness in terms of the party’s relationship with the British governments of the day, there was no Gladstone committed to the concept of home rule. The most important Unionist and Liberal Chief Secretaries (Wyndham and Birrell respectively) were sympathetic to the Irish party and were responsible for useful and constructive legislation. The UIL was unable to capitalise on these reforms (land and the universities) and was divided or inconsistent in its approach. Moreover both ministers lost influence and became isolated in governments that were at best luke-warm towards Irish affairs. Redmond was unable to exploit fully the hung parliaments of 1910, unlike Parnell in 1886 one has the impression of both party and leader being mere spectators at best reacting to rather than influencing events. Sinn Fein however was not formed until 1907/8 and although it was to benefit from support at the odd by-election it was not a serious electoral force until it formed a political front with more advanced nationalists/republicans towards the end of the Great War. The IPP therefore was effectively the only nationalist element in mainstream politics until 1916 or 1917. The “angry young men” that had excluded themselves from IPP politics had yet to find a popular political role (as opposed to a cultural one) for themselves. If Redmond or some other parliamentary nationalist was able to deliver home rule Sinn Fein, cultural and sporting nationalism would merely have influenced rather than formed events. The IRB, which had taken control of the GAA at a very early stage, was very much a fringe organisation until some years into the twentieth century. The various mechanisms by which the Union was to be ended within the next generation were all in place but it would take the arithmetic of Liberal politics, the Ulster Unionists and the Great War to bring these new forces into play. The role of religion As mentioned in Chapter 6 the Roman Catholic church was now becoming a marginal (though often useful) influence in nationalist politics, it was moderate and was seen to be associated with constitutional politics. Its anti-IRB attitude at a time when the IRB was being revived meant that in the post-Land War non-deferential age priests would only be able to have a large input if their political views coincided with those of their people. This was not appreciated by Ulster protestants, who saw the political influence of the Roman Catholic church as being as great as its undoubted control was over moral and social issues. Nevertheless the church through its social teaching and its identification with the noble and pious peasant came to espouse an exclusive Ireland that was Gaelic and catholic. This was reinforced by the exclusive nationalist DP Moran, who through his journal The Leader advocated an exclusively Gaelic and catholic Ireland. Protestants and any “saxon” cultural elements were excluded from this “Irish Ireland”; the literary likes of Yeats and O’Casey were also rejected. Doc 8i Moran’s exclusively catholic concept of Irishness is outlined in the following extract from The Leader of 27 July, 1901. “It has been hinted to us that it is our opinion that no one but a Catholic can be an Irishman. We never said so, nor do we think so … We are prepared to be perfectly frank with our sympathizers who think we are ‘too Catholic’. We have great admiration and respect for Thomas Davis, but his ‘Tolerance’ scheme did not work … When we look out on Ireland we see that those who believe, or may be immediately induced to believe, in Ireland a nation are, as a matter of fact, Catholics. When we look back on history we find also, as a matter of fact, that those who stood during the last three hundred years for Ireland as an Irish entity were mainly Catholics, and that those who sought to corrupt them and trample on them were mainly non-Catholics… Such being the facts, the only thinkable solution of the Irish national problem is that one side gets on top and absorbs the other until we have one nation, or that each develops independently. As we are for Ireland, we are in the existing circumstances on the side of Catholic development; and we see plainly that any genuine non-Catholic Irish nationalist must become reconciled to Catholic development or throw in his lot with the other side … If a non-Catholic nationalist Irishman does not wish to live in a Catholic atmosphere let him turn Orangeman …” The role of the land The other traditional aspect of Irish politics – the land – was now becoming irrelevant, as by-and-large the problem was being solved by Unionist governments (not Liberal ones) as part of their policy of ‘killing Home Rule by kindness’. Thus the 1886 Ashbourne Act, the 1891 Balfour Act and the 1903 Wyndham Act solved the land problem in a way that the much-trumpeted Gladstonian Acts of 1870 and 1881 did not. All but three of the years 1886 to 1905 were years of Conservative or Unionist government; therefore it could be argued that the Liberals did not have the opportunity to enact radical land legislation. Nevertheless it was the Unionists, the party of the landlords, who “solved” the land problem. They were the party most suited to carry through radical legislation due to their majority in the Lords. However the appointment of Wyndham as Chief Secretary in 1900 was a departure from the Conservative-Unionist norm; Wyndham was a great deal more sympathetic to Irish nationalism than any previous Chief Secretary. Moreover he enjoyed a rapport with various nationalists unusual amongst British politicians, especially Unionists. Wyndham was, however, working within a context where a number of landlords were suggesting a constructive and conclusive answer to the land issue. The Unionists were prepared to sell off the landed estates thus defusing the land issue, but at the cost of undermining the landed basis of the Union. Thus in the long run the Land League had succeeded in harnessing the peasantry to the home rule movement and undermining the landed basis of British rule. The Wyndham Land Purchase Act avoided the idea of compulsory purchase that was being mooted at the time; nevertheless it was radical because it was generous in its encouragement of both landlords and tenants to avail themselves of the Act. £12m was provided to encourage landlords to sell, even before the purchase price was negotiated with the tenants. The tenants were promised that their repayments would be generally less than their rents. The sweeping and absolute nature of the scheme alarmed John Dillon of the reunited parliamentary party, who not only complained that landlords were over-compensated but that the tenants had to pay too much; he feared that the national movement could not survive and also accommodate a constructive solution to the land issue. Dillon’s analysis was shown to be incorrect and home rule was not killed by kindness (or cynicism), but Dillon’s fears were not so far-fetched as it would seem; nationalism might have been killed by constructive Unionism. Augustine Birrell, the Liberal Chief Secretary, did produce a further Land Act in 1909 that was less advantageous to the landlords (and at a saving to the Treasury) and as the volume of settlements decreased it can be argued that this final British piece of land legislation altered the tenor and emphasis of the Wyndham Act without appreciably extending its provisions. Trades unionism and socialism Ireland was not immune to the social and political forces that were developing in Great Britain at the time. A number of New Unions had come into being around the time of the split. Parnell (though essentially conservative) had seen the importance of garnering support from whatever source possible, including fledgling labour interests. Unlike the pragmatic Parnell, Davitt’s attitude was more principled, he was a socialist though none-the-less a nationalist. Despite the fact that the post-split home rule movement retained a Parnellite propensity to utilise and absorb other interests, the movement was by-and-large hostile to labour aspirations: these conflicted with the capitalist and industrial pretensions of the new Ireland, the particular vested interests of the existing MPs and the outlook of the catholic church. The party (both before and after 1900) was either rural or bourgeois in thought and origin. Generally the more advanced nationalists who were also socially conservative in outlook shared this attitude. Nevertheless the two leading figures of Irish labour, Larkin and Connolly, provided essential contributions to the Irish national scene in the years immediately before the Great War. Larkin had for a time united protestant and catholic dockers in Belfast and had paralysed much of the city’s industry, challenging the hegemony of conservative Unionism. Ultimately however he failed and feeling betrayed by British trades unionism, founded the Irish Transport and General Workers Union, transferring much of his activity to Dublin. Once more he was to fail, as the ITGWU was defeated in the Dublin lockout of 1913. Despairing of the situation he withdrew to the USA leaving the Irish union apparatus and Irish socialism in the hands of James Connolly. Both Larkin and Connolly were socialist republicans. Larkin was thwarted by the vested interests of Dublin capitalism in the form of William Murphy, a member of the home rule party who epitomised catholic bourgeois self-interest. Nevertheless Larkin had established an Irish union movement that was to be no cat’s-paw of British trades unionism. Moreover the 1913 transport strike and lockout attracted the attention and support of a number of advanced nationalists (who were otherwise socially and politically conservative); the horrendous living and working conditions of the Dublin slum-dwellers appalled them. Connolly using a different strategy than that used by Larkin planned a republican socialist revolution against British rule and the capitalist system. Although Irish labour was an important element in the revolution of 1916, the attitude of the other participants was at best ambivalent to the concept of socialism. Women’s campaigners Similarly the Irish national movement in its various forms had an equivocal attitude to women’s suffrage. The British suffrage movement had an uphill struggle that only started to be resolved in legal terms in 1918 and then largely due to the experience of the Great War. It would be unrealistic to assume that the cause of women’s suffrage would have prospered in a deeply conservative environment such as Ireland. As in Britain the hostile, the indifferent and the positive were to be found in all political parties and movements. Generally however as with the attitude to socialism, the nationalist outlook was grudging, partly due to entrenched conservatism but also due to the belief that women’s suffrage was an irrelevance when compared to the nationalist cause. Therefore although Irishwomen obtained complete suffrage in the newly independent Ireland before their sisters in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the nationalist/republican movement was generally indifferent, if not hostile to women’s rights. On the whole it was felt that such demands were marginal or even diversionary when compared to the national struggle; much in the same way as was felt about socialism. Women campaigners (some such as Constance Markievicz were committed socialists, who never stopped working for the working class) were prominent in the national cause, very often playing a more radical role than their male counterparts. Certainly in the Treaty debates and in the post-independence civil war, the most militant women were associated with an uncompromising republicanism (all six women TDs in the 2nd Dail were staunch republicans). It must be added however that whilst some of the militant women gave priority to the national cause (such as Maude Gonne MacBride), others, like Constance Markievicz, never let either their social(ist) commitment or their republicanism be eclipsed by the other. By-and-large the male figures in the national struggle were dismissive of the dedication of the female militants even when their actions outstripped those of the men. The new issues of socialism and feminism were slow to develop in the context of a conservative society where attentions were concentrated on the nationalist and unionist issue. In Britain despite late nineteenth century origins, the achievement of socialist and women’s campaigners did not bear fruit until well into the twentieth century. In the more conservative Irish environment these two causes were integral but peripheral to the dominating issue of the national/unionist drama. Previous reference has been made to the emergence of an Ulster unionist identity; this was largely ignored in nationalist and Liberal circles. Ulster Unionism was in the period 1905-21 able to sabotage part of the dream of the ‘angry young men’ but these militants were to be inspired by Ulster Unionist tactics as the Ulstermen were to defy both the government and the Commons they were also to arm themselves on a massive and spectacular scale. The ghost of Parnell stalked through the decade following his death, preventing unification of the home rule movement until 1900. The ghost helped influence a complete generation of nationalists who adopted policies more extreme than that of the pre-1890 Parnell. His impact can be seen clearly in James Joyce’s Dubliners, in which the theme of the death and betrayal of Parnell occurs in poems such as To a Shade (Yeats’s poem addressed to Parnell and written in 1913) |