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9. ULSTER UNIONISM AND STEPS TO PARTITION Ulster protestants identified the Union with economic success and with the numerical protection provided by being part of the protestant majority of the British Isles. This was in contrast to being a minority within a catholic home rule or independent Ireland, where there would be minimal prospects for economic growth and prosperity. There was a blatant element of sectarian self-interest implicit in this attitude; a wish to keep a degree of superiority and security. There was also a genuine identification with British values and aspirations that were not shared by most of the catholic population. Such an attitude had always been there, but in the late nineteenth century it was accentuated by the radicalisation of nationalist politics: for instance by Parnell’s party becoming the spokesbody for the catholic church; the growth of the land agitation and the emergence of cultural (Gaelic) nationalism that was totally alien to protestants and unionists. To this must be added a real fear (even if exaggerated) of the catholic church with its increasingly confident, uncompromising and dogmatic stance on social matters. (This was in total polarity to an uncompromising adherence to protestant ‘values’ that were by-and-large shared by both the British electorate and British public opinion makers). In fact (especially since the shock of the 1886 Home Rule crisis) anglicans in the north tended to have more in common with presbyterians than they had with their relatively non-dynamic co-religionists in the south. Ulster protestants were of all classes and could not be thought of as a colonial class as those in the south were believed to be. (Though even in the last few years of the twentieth century Ulster Unionists were thought of as a colonial population by nationalists.) These unionists were firmly rooted in the northern counties, they knew no other home despite their loyalty to the crown and Britain. On the other hand the anglican protestants of the south – both of the landed and professional classes – tended to have the necessary social links with England. (There was also in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a significant anglican population of the lower middle and working classes in Dublin and some areas of Leinster and Munster.) If the political climate moved towards home rule many of the landed interest might accept the new situation, knowing that they had the wherewithal to leave, should either nationalism or catholicism become too extreme or overwhelming; this would leave the remaining elements of southern unionism vulnerable and isolated. Few were consciously considering leaving Ireland at the turn of the century and southern unionists would continue to oppose nationalism for some years to come. Nevertheless the land purchase schemes had undermined the foundations of the Union outside Ulster. Many of the Anglo-Irish ascendancy were receiving a worthwhile compensation that would enable a quitting of Ireland to be palatable and practical should the need arise. In electoral terms unionism in the south had been reduced to a small handful of seats (South Dublin and Trinity College) – the scattered demography of southern unionism meaning that there was no hope of winning further seats (there were occasional temporary victories elsewhere such as in Galway in 1900). Opposition to the Second Home Rule Bill The second home rule bill was defeated in the House of Lords rather than by Ulster Unionism, nevertheless the speeches and actions made in 1892-3 were important in forging an Ulster Unionist identity that was to be such a feature of Irish and British politics in the twentieth century. In mid-June 1892, shortly before the general election, the Ulster Convention was held in a specially constructed pavilion at Belfast’s Botanic Gardens. It was presided over by the Duke of Abercorn, the premier landowner and aristocrat of “peripheral Ulster” (see below). Although the Ulster Unionist initiative was in the process of moving from the Conservative landed interest to the Conservative and Liberal Unionist business interest, the southwest and mid-Ulster landed dynasties were to remain significant. Conservatives and Liberal Unionists came together and a unity and discipline was established that showed that Ulster Unionism had learned from its unpreparedness of 1885. An extract from Thomas Sinclair’s speech to the Convention (he was the leading Liberal Unionist in Ulster) illustrates a determination to resist home rule that would be put into operation some years later at the time of the third home rule crisis: “Fellow countrymen, Mr Gladstone’s threat is a serious one, but, nevertheless, we can never falter in our resolve. We are children of the revolution of 1688, and, cost what it may, we will have nothing to do with a Dublin parliament. If it be ever set up we shall simply ignore its existence. Its acts will be but as waste paper; the police will find our barracks preoccupied with our own constabulary; its judges will sit in empty court-houses. The early efforts of its executive will be spent in devising means to deal with passive resistance to its taxation.” The Ulster Liberals and their concerns had been treated with off-hand disdain by Gladstone at a meeting in March 1893 and nearly all had become staunch Unionists. The Liberal Sinclair in his speech of the previous summer had touched on issues at the heart of Ulster protestant sensibilities. He had referred to the Whig revolution of 1688 to which not only Orangemen but also all Ulster protestants saw as their ancestors’ time of trial and of their eventual triumph and deliverance. The Glorious Revolution and the Williamite settlement marked a political victory whereby protestant concepts of “civil and religious liberty” triumphed over the forces of catholic absolutism. Given the propensity to develop a siege mentality and their total alienation from Irish nationalism a very powerful political force was being formed. Moreover the reference to taxation underlined the fear of Ulster businessmen and their protestant workers of potential nationalist protectionism. This, together with a taxation policy that would bleed the thrifty north in order to subsidise the indolent and industrially underdeveloped south, was a very real perception and fear amongst the Ulster Unionists. Such rhetoric was not taken seriously outside unionist circles and the failure to do so was to have important consequences for both the nationalist and Liberal causes in the twentieth century. Unity between Conservatives, Liberal Unionists and the most sectarian elements would be difficult to achieve. Although the Orange Order provided an Ulster-wide network of lodges that could (and did) organise, coordinate and resist home rule moves, its overtly sectarian nature made it an unacceptable vehicle for Liberal Unionists and not a few Conservatives. With this in mind, Unionist Clubs were formed by Lord Templetown, together with an umbrella Unionist Clubs Council, at the time of the bill’s introduction in February of 1893. Over 200 clubs were formed; at this time and during the 1911-14 period these were to be the major means of anti-home rule organisation at a local level. Unionist Clubs were also formed in Great Britain; in both islands the club acted as a means of propagating and distributing publicity material. Additionally the Ulster Defence Union was set up to represent the complete spectrum of Ulster Unionism and to coordinate resistance to home rule. As in 1886 there was some talk (but little action) of arming and drilling. The precedents had been set once again for the 1912-14 crisis. As well as resisting the bill in parliament Salisbury, Balfour and the leading British Unionists attended and addressed rallies; the Ulster issue became their major line of opposition to home rule. Formation of a separate Ulster Unionist structure (“Devolution is the Latin for Home Rule – TP O’Connor”) Given the attitude of the Conservative/Unionist leadership the devolution issue of a few years later came as a shock to Ulster Unionists. Northern unionists perceived a degree of equivocation in southern unionism at the time of the ‘Devolution Crisis’ of 1904-5. Therefore they set up their own Ulster Unionist Council as they considered the southern-dominated Irish Unionist Alliance to be ineffective, if not ‘wet’. Basically some southern unionists had explored the possibility of quasi-home rule/devolution and they were disowned by their political colleagues especially by those in the north. The Unionist government of the day was embarrassed by the nature of the talks coordinated by Sir Anthony MacDonnell (Wyndham’s senior civil servant in Dublin who had home rule sympathies). This event, as well as leading to the resignation of Wyndham raised suspicions in the Ulster Unionists of not only their co-religionists in the south but also of the British government (a Unionist one at that). In these circumstances the Ulster Unionists felt happier taking their fate into their own hands. The UUC was to provide the machinery to fight home rule in the years 1911-14; it worked amicably and effectively with the southern-based IUA in the years following 1906. It was not the conscious intention of the UUC to abandon the unionists of the south to home rule, merely a realisation that home rule could best be defeated by utilising fully the Ulster dynamic. Some perceived that if unionists failed to defeat home rule in the other three provinces, unionists in Ulster would still have the machinery to continue the fight. Once the Third Home Rule crisis (1911-14) came about southern unionists realised (as did British unionists) that Ulster Unionism was the one issue that might successfully defeat home rule in the whole of Ireland. Partition was not a solution of first choice but an indication that unionists had failed in their primary objective of preserving the Union intact. In due course Ulster Unionists were to make a virtue out of necessity and were to value their ability to resist Irish nationalism unencumbered by the increasingly dead weight of southern unionism. A separate university structure One of the most contentious matters in nineteenth century politics had been the university issue: there was the sixteenth century University of Dublin (Trinity College, Dublin) open to all, but anglican and establishment in ethos. To cater for others Peel had set up the Queen’s Colleges in 1845, located in the major provincial cities: Cork, Galway and Belfast. In effect these were to cater for the predominantly catholic populations of Munster and Connacht and for the presbyterians of Ulster, whilst being open to all for a non-denominational education. The two southern colleges survived but did not really prosper as they met with the strong disapproval of the catholic church, which demanded the right of catholics to be educated by catholics in an exclusively catholic institution. Therefore an unofficial university was set up privately and in defiance of government wishes. Queen’s College Belfast prospered and expanded however. In 1908 the Liberal government bowed to the inevitable and recognised the unofficial Catholic University fully and incorporated it with Cork and Galway to form the National University of Ireland, which was organised on the same lines as the National University of Wales. (The failure of the old Queen’s Colleges had led to their replacement in 1879 by the Royal University and Examining Body that also catered for the Catholic University.) The Belfast College was separated from its original sisters and incorporated as a university in its own right (Queen’s University Belfast). This was an implicit recognition of fundamental differences between north and south and the first legal and institutional division to come about. The Liberals were (within a few years) pledged willy-nilly to Home Rule but were slow to recognise the precedent that they had created by differentiating between the culturally antagonistic natures found in the north and the south. Mutual incomprehension Nationalists and catholics tended to discount and dismiss Ulster Unionism as Ulster protestants made up only half of the population of the province and sometimes failed (by one seat) to achieve a unionist majority in terms of parliamentary representation within the province. Similarly Liberals with their close identification with parliamentary majorities tended to dismiss the Ulster Unionists as a mere sectional and sectarian interest. They failed to take into account the points explained above of Ulster protestant strength. There was of course an equal-sized catholic population who should have been aware of the dynamism of Ulster protestantism; however they were not, as they saw unionism as being no more than an important but unproven regional force that was a minority within the island. In 1885 the unionist interest in Ulster had been disunited, furthermore there was also a vein of Ulster tenant-right presbyterianism that could not be considered as truly unionist. To the catholics, as nationalists, non-nationalism within Ireland was incomprehensible and did not need to be taken that seriously. Moreover the degree of mutual cultural and religious isolation within the province meant that it was very likely that neither community was aware of or cared for the aspirations of the other. The unionist population was as yet untested and although self-assured, was also unconscious of its own strengths. The strength of Ulster Unionism, the core and periphery The core of Ulster Unionism was the middle-class population of Belfast and its associated industrial and suburban towns; it was generally able to enlist the support of the protestant working-class with its long tradition of sectarian confrontation, which was often associated with the Orange Order. Bourgeois confidence and economic clout became particularly potent when combined with working-class numbers, between them they accounted for much of the critical mass of Ulster Unionism. Urban and suburban anglicans and presbyterians were able to cooperate with each other. In the outlying counties of Ulster the landlord interest remained as the centre of Ulster Unionism: unlike the landlords of elsewhere in Ireland the landowners of the peripheral counties were sustained and supported by an appreciable number of protestant tenants, who were largely anglican, there were few presbyterians in these counties. The landowners remained as the natural leaders of rural unionism in Fermanagh and Cavan in particular, they had been the first to utilise orangeism as a mechanism by which to defend protestant interests against home rule and the land movement. The landed families of south west Ulster (for instance the Saundersons and Crichtons) were of great importance in the foundation of Irish and Ulster Unionism; their distrust of British governments dated back to the disestablishment era, which (ironically) revitalised their “protestant” Church of Ireland. These landed families not only wanted to preserve their social and material life, they also believed passionately in their church. Although the landowners of the peripheral counties were eclipsed by the middle-class population of the Belfast core in the organisation of Ulster Unionism they remained a significant and vital element. Their unionism was never diluted like that of their southern counterparts; as frontiersmen they had the will to resist home rule and they had a protestant element amongst their tenantry on whom they could rely. The political status of the landed proprietor of the peripheral Ulster counties is note-worthy as both nationalism and the rest of Ulster Unionism were bourgeois-dominated. Though like southern unionism the peripheral phenomenon was landlord-dominated, it was not landlord-oriented it was protestant-oriented. They owed their status not to deference (there was little deference in Ulster) but to their determination and the religion they shared with their anglican tenants. In the circumstances the Orange Order was both the practical and the natural organisation for defending the Union. The Orange Order This does not necessarily mean that the utilisation of orangeism took place without some misgivings, as the Orange Order had a reputation for sectarianism. It was associated with rural confrontation and urban rioting. Before the 1880s it had tended to divide protestants, although presbyterians had started being attracted to the order from the time of the 1859 Evangelical Revival. In the last fifteen years of the century it went quite some way towards uniting protestants. As mentioned in Chapter 2 the Orange Institution had originated in County Armagh following confrontation with the Defenders. Utilising the century-old tradition of celebrating the deliverance of protestants from catholic and Jacobite rule by William of Orange between 1689 and 1691, the weavers of County Armagh started a movement (organised along masonic lines) to defend and celebrate their religion and keep their land. Within a short space of time it was being utilised by landlords and magistrates to defend the status quo against the United Irishmen. At first strongly opposed to the Union, which they associated with the loss of protestant privilege and the Trojan horse of catholic emancipation, the Order eventually became reconciled to the Union. By this time the movement had spread amongst Irish anglicans and some presbyterians not only in Ulster but elsewhere in the island, it had also found supporters in Great Britain especially in the army. The dubious Duke of Cumberland was a leading member and by the mid-1830s the movement was ripe for dissolution. Some ten years later the Order was revived under the leadership of the Earl of Enniskillen (a Fermanagh magnate). Generally speaking the landed classes found the movement insufficiently genteel and too sectarian for their liking, it operated as a secret society and was associated with riot and disorder, especially in Belfast, where it grew rapidly in the 1850s (a time of catholic influx). William Johnston, a minor County Down landowner, was another exception to the rule of proprietorial disdain: he broke the Whig Party Processions Acts of 1850 and 1860, was jailed and subsequently elected to parliament as an independent. It was only with the Land League and National League incursions into Ulster that a significant number of landowners from the peripheral counties embraced orangeism. With some hesitation the middle-class started to adopt orangeism, which continued to repel many ex-Liberals. Despite its long and undistinguished (if not unsavoury) pedigree the populist Order was a practical means by which to coordinate opposition to home rule. Just as it was adopted by the landed proprietors it was also respectablised by the protestant clergy, who provided local leadership and a substantial degree of internal restraint. To most Ulster protestants “home rule was Rome rule” and whatever their doubts as to the Orange Order’s past it was one of the best ways of harnessing mass support for the Union. Though elements of Liberal presbyterianism and the professions remained aloof from the movement, providing overt sectarianism was curbed, a substantial number of protestants were prepared to join the Order. It expressed not only political opposition to home rule, but also the genuine religious faith of the Ulster protestants. Though well represented in the UUC (a quarter of the delegates), the Orange Order was not the only organisation through which home rule was opposed. The Order’s sectarian image meant that despite its wide populist if not democratic base (that is within the protestant community) it was never completely acceptable to all unionists. Naturally it was loathed and feared by the catholic and nationalist population due to its supremacist and sectarian history; it was also vilified because it was seen as being an effective force against home rule. Moreover such a “secret society” was not only mysterious to outsiders, but was also sinister. Therefore “orangeism” tended to be used as a type of pejorative shorthand with which to cover the whole Ulster Unionist phenomenon. There was much for which the order could be blamed, at least 6 of Belfast’s 15 riots in the century from 1813 to 1914 can be attributed to the Orangemen (Buckland, Irish Unionism [pamphlet 1973]). However it is clear from this that whilst the Order deserved its unsavoury reputation, it was by no means solely responsible for disorder in a city where rioting was endemic. Its role and intermittent influence in Ulster Unionism both before and after partition can in some ways be equated with that of the trades-union movement within the twentieth century Labour party. Economic self-confidence Reference has been made in Chapter 4 to Belfast’s economic development; by the time of the 3rd Home Rule crisis Ulster’s industrial prosperity was at its height. Its business class was participating in global markets in what is now recognised as an era of globalisation. Belfast’s reliance on export-oriented industry and the imperial market partly accounts for the industrial and commercial middleclass being hostile to Home Rule (William James Pirrie the Chairman of Harland and Wolfe was the exception to the rule; between the 2nd and 3rd Home Rule bills he became a Liberal Home ruler). At the end of the nineteenth century linen sales had suffered a reduction in demand and a substantial number of bankruptcies had occurred. However, in the early twentieth century sales to the empire had been successfully promoted and markets were won or re-won - exports to South America, which had turned to continental manufacturers, were routed via Hamburg and made to look like German linens. New lines in luxury linen were marketed. Harland and Wolfe’s success in the prestigious and lucrative passenger market had been established in the 1870s. At the end of the century and in the opening years of the twentieth the White Star giants Oceanic, Olympic and the ill-starred Titanic were built. Such prosperity engendered a sense of superiority and a jealous determination that the “backward” and priest-ridden” south should not dismantle the Union at the expense of profits and protestantism. The onset of the 3rd home rule crisis The People’s Budget (1909) triggered off a major constitutional crisis for which Asquith was unprepared. Not only was the Unionist opposition hostile to the budget proposals but the United Irish League also objected to the increased taxes on beer and whiskey, the major industries of the south of Ireland (moreover many of the UIL had direct and personal interests in these). In December 1909 Asquith in a speech at the Albert Hall had mentioned ‘Self government for Ireland’, this was seen as a bid for Irish support and no further developments took place until the spring of 1910 when the indecisive Asquith was forced by the actions of Lloyd George into coming to an understanding with Redmond and the Irish party: the Irish would not oppose the budget providing it was understood that the Liberal government would introduce legislation to deal with the question of the Lords’ veto. Implicit in this was the understanding that the Liberals would honour their twenty five year old commitment to home rule. The Liberals were determined to curb the power of the House of Lords but they had been undecided as to what action to take. It took the pragmatism of Lloyd George and the hard bargaining of Redmond to settle the issue. Home rule was not publicised very heavily by either of the major British parties in the 1910 elections. The resistance to Lords’ reform was not just based upon the self-interest of the Lords, taxation and thwarting liberal fads, it was based upon the fear of home rule legislation. The Unionists were fearful of raising the issue and the lukewarm attitude of the Liberals to their Gladstonian legacy is apparent by their reluctance to raise the concept, despite their understanding with Redmond in April of that year. All knew however that home rule legislation would follow in the wake of a Parliament Act. Doc 9i Redmond wrote to Morley at the end of November 1909 and effectively delivered an ultimatum to the Liberal government. “The political conditions in Ireland are such that, unless an official declaration on the question of Home Rule be made, not only will it be impossible for us to support Liberal candidates in England, but we will most unquestionably have to ask our friends to vote against them … as you know very well the opposition of Irish voters in Lancashire, Yorkshire, and other places including Scotland, would most certainly mean the loss of many seats … we must therefore press for an official declaration … on the lines of national self-government, subject to Imperial control, in the next Parliament.” Doc 9ii Asquith’s speech at the Albert Hall in December 1909 can be seen as a direct response to Redmond’s ultimatum. “…a week before my accession to the office of Prime Minister, I described Ireland as the one undeniable failure of British statesmanship. I repeat here tonight what I said then, speaking on behalf of my colleagues, and, I believe, of my party. The solution of the problem can be found only in one way …. by a policy which, while explicitly safeguarding the supreme and indefeasible authority of the Imperial Parliament, will set up in Ireland a system of full self-government in regard to purely Irish affairs. There is not, and there cannot be, any question of separation. There is not, and there cannot be, any question of rival or competing supremacies. But, subject to those conditions, that is the Liberal policy. For reasons which I believe to be adequate, the present Parliament was disabled in advance from proposing any such solution. But in the new House of Commons the hands of the Liberal Government and the Liberal majority will be in this matter entirely free.” Map 2 Distribution of catholics and protestants in Ulster 1911 From Smith Howard, Ireland Some Episodes From Her Past (London 1974) This map is based on the distribution of protestants and catholics in the nine counties of Ulster, the data is taken from the 1911 census. The population of Ulster was not distributed equally, the highest densities were to be found in the eastern counties with protestant majorities. During 1910 and 1911 various changes took place in Unionist circles. Balfour resigned the Conservative leadership and was replaced by Bonar Law. Law, although of Canadian birth, was of Ulster parentage and had spent some time in the province. Ulster Unionists could now feel confident as to the support they would receive from Conservatives in Great Britain. Walter Long the leader of the Irish Unionists had been returned for an English constituency and was replaced by Sir Edward Carson. Carson was a southern Irish lawyer who, at both the Irish and London bars, had established a reputation as one of the foremost KCs of the age. Carson became leader of the Ulster Unionists – there were very few southern Irish Unionist seats still in existence (Carson had sat for Dublin University). From then on the southern Unionist contribution to the Home Rule fight would be via the House of Lords and through the many social contacts that the ascendancy had with the great and influential in Great Britain. Carson, unlike some of the Ulster Unionists was not a sectarian politician. Admittedly he cared passionately for the fate of his protestant co-religionists in a catholic-dominated Ireland and he threw himself enthusiastically into the defence of Ulster at a time when the sectarian weapon was used. His origins were Liberal Unionist and he had combined with Irish nationalist MPs to fight instances of inappropriate legislation and maladministration that were to be inflicted on Ireland. Of course he wished to defend the interests of his class and creed but he genuinely believed that the whole of Ireland would suffer if home rule ever came about. James Craig, a County Down MP, became his deputy. It is sometimes claimed that Craig lacked the imagination of Carson; he was to remain primarily interested in saving Ulster from home rule; it was not that he intended to ditch the southern provinces but merely that his commitment to Ulster was greater than his commitment to Ireland. He would not risk defending Ireland if this meant putting Ulster at risk. Ultimately however he achieved his essentially negative goal of preserving Ulster, whilst Carson failed and the other participants (British, the nationalists and the republicans) were obliged to accept something radically different from what they had originally wanted. Apart from the special reasons why Ulster protestants feared home rule, unionists in general were prepared to countenance rebellion against the constitutionally elected government for two reasons: They believed that the Liberal government had only adopted home rule to stay in office (broadly speaking true if one considers the budget/veto understanding of April 1910 and the fact that Asquith had not Gladstone’s commitment and did not adopt home rule until he was threatened with losing his overall majority). To the above insincerity must be added the more serious charge of irresponsibility, as unionists genuinely believed that home rule legislation was ultra vires, unconstitutional and therefore treasonable. Despite the moderate nature of the proposed powers of a home rule parliament, British unionists saw this as a concession to equivocal – if not disloyal – elements, a betrayal of loyal Ulster protestants in particular and a signal to Britain’s enemies that the government was quite willing to concede part of her state to nationalist elements. Furthermore those within the empire who had similar or more radical ideals would note such action. Doc 9iii Lord Willoughby de Broke one of the leading opponents of the Parliament Bill made clear in a speech made in September 1912 at Dromore, Co Down, the belief that Home Rule would threaten the Empire. (Repoted in the Belfast Newsletter, September 1912 “The Unionists of England were going to help Unionists over here, not only by making speeches. Peaceable methods would be tried first, but if the last resort was forced on them by the Radical government, the latter would find that they had not only Orangemen against them, but that every white man in the British Empire would be giving support, either moral or active, to one of the most loyal populations that ever fought under the Union Jack.” Terms of the 3rd Home Rule bill Asquith’s bill provided for an Irish parliament of two chambers (a Senate of 40 members and a House of Commons of 164 MPs). Initially the Senate was to be appointed by the British cabinet and subsequently by the Irish cabinet through the Lord-Lieutenant who could exercise a veto on legislation in consultation with the cabinet in London. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would deal with appeals concerning the validity of Irish legislation. Senate appointments would be for eight years with a quarter being replaced every two years. The maximum period between Commons elections would be five years as in the Imperial parliament. Disputes between the two houses would be resolved by a joint sitting and vote of the Senate and Commons (i.e. rather similar to the arrangements in the 1886 bill). 42 MPs would continue to sit at Westminster, this provision being similar to 1893. As in the previous bills no religion could be established or endowed. The Crown, defence, foreign affairs, coinage, weights and measures, overseas trade and navigation remained under the control of Westminster. Certain matters were reserved for Westminster, in particular the new welfare legislation concerning old age pensions and National Insurance; the police would remain a reserved function for six years. Virtually all other powers were transferred and the new executive had the power to levy new taxes and increase the rates of existing ones. Interestingly customs duties could be raised within limits, quite a concession from a government and party firmly wedded to free trade. The 3rd Home Rule Bill was introduced to the Commons in April 1912 and from an early stage the possibility of county exclusion was considered in Liberal circles. Asquith set his face against any such amendment (i.e. the Agar Robartes Amendment of June 1912 the success of which would have been a severe embarrassment to the unionists, who would have only preserved the most easterly part of Ulster). In January 1913 following its third reading in the Commons the bill was rejected as expected. Over the next few months the bill began its progress all over again in line with the terms of the Parliament Act; the constitutional countdown towards the Home Rule bill eventually becoming law was underway. However a number of significant developments were apparent though Asquith appeared to ignore them or at least procrastinate. The Unionists had organised a number of massive demonstrations in Ulster and Great Britain. Even before the Home Rule bill was introduced the anti-home rule campaign came alive at the massive meeting at Craigavon, Craig’s house overlooking Belfast Lough, in September 1911. A day or so later the Ulster Unionist Council started to coordinate its contingency plans including those for establishing a provisional government should home rule be enacted. To coincide with the introduction of the bill in April 1912 the Ulster Unionist leadership together with Bonar Law and seventy Conservative MPs attended a massive demonstration at the Balmoral show grounds on the outskirts of Belfast. This rally effectively committed the Conservatives to the Ulster Unionist agenda, as a means of killing off home rule. In July Law addressed another monster meeting at Blenheim Palace at which he warned the government that there were no lengths to which the Ulster Unionists would not go to resist home rule. Significantly as the leader of the opposition he also pledged himself to the same potentially rebellious course. Two months later the Ulster Unionist leadership obtained the signatures of three-quarters of Ulster’s protestant population to resist home rule by any means at their disposal in the Ulster Covenant of September 1912. Doc 9iv An extract from Bonar Law’s Blenheim speech (29 July, 1912) made clear the extent of his commitment to the Ulster Unionists. “Before I occupied the position which I now fill in the Party, I said that, in my belief, speaking of the Ulster Protestants: if an attempt were made to deprive these men of their birthright – as part of a corrupt Parliamentary bargain – they would be justified in resisting such an attempt by all means in their power, including force. I said it then, and I repeat it now with a full sense of the responsibility which attaches to my position, that, in my opinion if such an attempt is made I can imagine no length of resistance to which Ulster can go in which I should not be prepared to support them, and in which, in my belief, they would not be supported by the overwhelming majority of the British people.” The Solemn League and Covenant The Ulster Covenant and its counterpart for women were not only signed in Ulster but by Unionist sympathisers in Great Britain and the rest of Ireland. The concept was at the heart of the Ulster Unionist mentality, a solemn promise made before God. The tradition went back to that of the Scottish Covenants of the seventeenth century (in particular the League and Covenant of 1643); the concept of the covenanters was etched deeply in the culture of Ulster presbyterianism. In the seventeenth century their ancestors had “banded” together to defend their religion that was at the heart of their way of life. Those who signed the 1912 Covenant were aware of the historic consequences of such a pledge, it could well mean war and persecution as in the “killing times” of the seventeenth century. This was no mere histrionic gesture (though it was an inspired piece of political theatre); it was a pledge of resistance that indicated that the government had broken its contract with its people. The Unionists were reverting to an earlier concept of government; if the authorities broke faith with the people, the people were absolved from their loyalty; moreover the covenanters had a God-given duty to resist the faithless Liberal government. The seriousness of the Covenanting concept was lost on catholic and nationalist Ireland as it was on most outside Scotland, but the propaganda impact was appreciated by many others in Great Britain, influenced by the generally effective Ulster Unionist publicity machine in Great Britain and the reporting of those such as JL Garvin, editor of the Observer. Doc 9v Garvin’s description of the scene in Belfast and of his emotions at the time of the signing of the Covenant are as follows: “Through the mass, with drums and fifes, sashes and banners, the clubs marched all day. The street surged with cheering, but still no disorder, still no policemen, still no shouts of rage or insult. Yet no-one for a moment could have mistaken the concentrated will and courage of these people. They do not know what fear and flinching mean in this business, and they are not going to know. They do not, indeed, believe it possible that they can be beaten, but no extremity, the worst, will ever see them ashamed.” Doc 9vi Ulster’s Solemn League and Covenant. Being convinced in our consciences that Home Rule would be disastrous to the material well-being of Ulster as well of the whole of Ireland, subversive of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship, and perilous to the unity of the Empire, we, whose names are underwritten, men of Ulster, loyal subjects of His Gracious Majesty King George V, humbly relying on the God Whom our fathers in the days of stress and trial confidently trusted, do hereby pledge ourselves in solemn Covenant throughout this our time of threatened calamity to stand by one another in defending for ourselves and our children our cherished position of equal citizenship in the United Kingdom and in using all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a home rule parliament in Ireland. And in the event of such a Parliament being forced upon us we further and mutually pledge ourselves to refuse to recognise its authority. In sure confidence that God will defend the right, we hereto subscribe our names. And further we individually declare that we have not already signed this Covenant. The above was signed by me at ………….. “Ulster Day,” Saturday, 28 September, 1912 …………………… God Save the King There were a number of other unionist initiatives involving publicity and propaganda in Great Britain of varying quality. One of the most innovative was the use of publicity vans with a “magic lantern” and also workers who could be switched from one constituency to another. Belfast trades-unionists were brought over to canvas in working-class areas; literature was distributed in Britain. 102 tours to Ireland were arranged so as to contrast favourably the unionist and nationalist environments in Ireland. By-and-large these were joint ventures organised by Irish, Ulster and British unionist organisations. Both Lloyd George and Churchill broke cabinet ranks suggesting various compromises that embarrassed their colleagues. The two most significant developments took place in January 1913. Carson introduced an unsuccessful amendment excluding all nine counties of Ulster from home rule. Carson’s amendment was a wrecking device but in the autumn of 1913 he accepted partition as the most realistic policy, maintaining that Ulster’s nine counties should be and six counties must be excluded. Moreover he had come to maintain that Ulster should not be jeopardised to maintain the principle of all-Irish unionism. Thus a southern Unionist had conceded defeat and had failed in his attempt to use Ulster as a tactical device to defeat home rule in its entirety. Though extra-parliamentary tactics were to be used to try to wreck home rule completely the Unionists had all but written off the southern three provinces and had accepted the concept of partition. Perhaps the most startling development in Ulster was the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force in the same month. A limit on recruitment of 100,000 was imposed and military training largely within the law was undertaken. The UVF was formed for three reasons: To act as a deterrent so that home rule would not be imposed. To resist the imposition of home rule through force should all else fail (as implied by the terms of the Covenant, the setting up of an indemnity fund together with the evacuation scheme for non-combatants). To control and discipline the sectarian elements who might riot or start a pogrom. (It is possible that Asquith’s procrastination may have been due to a belief that in time the Ulster Unionist cause would be discredited and dissipated by sectarian excess.) There is no doubt that the UVF would have resisted home rule by force of arms even if divisions within the Ulster Unionist leadership had become manifest. However their prime purpose, that of deterrence, was not completely effective as both the government and the UIL believed the UUC was bluffing. Nationalist and Liberal newspapers were contemptuous of the actions of the Ulster Unionist and Conservative movements - they did not appreciate the degree of commitment involved, there was a tendency to dismiss the flurry of activity between 1911 and 1914 as mere histrionic antics, or at worst, as thoroughly irresponsible rhetoric from the leader of the opposition. Doc 9vii Redmond wrote to Asquith in November 1913 discounting the Ulster Unionist threat. “Writing with a full knowledge of my country and its conditions … I do not think that anything like a widespread rebellious movement can ever take place; and all our friends in Ulster, who would be the first victims of any rebellious movement, have never ceased to inform me that all such apprehensions are without any real foundation.” The UVF was mocked or else condemned for its criminal irresponsibility, but in fact its level of training was as high as the British Territorials. Many ex-officers, NCOs and soldiers trained the force and there were many with Boer War experience. Eventually a retired Indian Army general was appointed to command the force (on the recommendation of Field Marshall Lord Roberts). A headquarters staff operated under the direction of Wilfred Spender, who (like others) had resigned from the army to work for the UVF. Moreover channels of communication were kept open with Major General Henry Wilson, Director of Operations on the Imperial General Staff. (Wilson, a southern Irishman, was an intriguer who was also endeavouring to commit the British army and therefore the government to what amounted to an alliance with France. His action was beyond the bounds of his brief as chief liaison officer to the French army.) The UVF achieved a degree of motorisation greater than that of the Regular Army of the day and had signal and medical personnel. It did not become fully operational until the spring of 1914 when it received its bulk cargo of 35,000 rifles and 3 million rounds of ammunition (this was the UUC’s greatest propaganda and political coup). At that stage 23,000 men were mobilised against a garrison of 1,000 regular troops – sufficient if needs be to seize regular arms depots and any artillery within the province. It must be said that even with the bulk shipment of arms and ammunition there were three types of weapon and severe logistical problems would have arisen. Even if armouries and depots had been seized the acquisition of further stocks would have increased the scope of the logistical nightmare. Whatever might have been the military limitations of the UVF, it and the UUC had outflanked the government and hardened attitudes that made any hope of a political settlement even more remote. The partial arming of the UVF created a heroic myth (that was reinforced by the 36th (Ulster) Division’s losses on the first day of the Somme) that glorified intransigence as a virtue both during the Great War and more significantly at the time of partition and in the decades that followed. By 1914 the UVF’s evacuation plans for women and children had been completed and an indemnity fund of over £1m had been set up. The Standing Committee of the UUC was ready to take over as a provisional government should the Liberal government impose the Home Rule Act on Ulster. None of this would have been possible without massive internal support (as instanced by the Covenant and the funds and organisation of the Belfast business community) together with the donations and active help of Unionists in Great Britain, the collusion of authorities within Ulster and the lack of a coherent strategy by the Asquith government. The evacuation plans were dependant on the support of British Unionists. As well as receiving large donations from the public, sizeable sums were received from the Astors, Rothschilds and Bedfords. In fact the British establishment was openly or privately supporting the Ulster Unionists against the government. In February and March 1914 the government floated the concept of county exclusion for six years, but Carson and the Unionists wanted to exclude six if not nine counties permanently. Asquith would not agree to this and in May the government introduced its Temporary Exclusion bill (i.e. six years only), in July the Lords amended this to total exclusion for ever. The Provisional Government then met in Belfast and in order to avoid total breakdown the Buckingham Palace Conference took place. This however broke up in disagreement on the day after the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Within ten days Europe was at war and Irishmen from both north and south joined up. In September home rule became law but its implementation was suspended for the duration of hostilities with the Ulster issue still unresolved. The government had run out of options by the summer of 1914 following the Curragh Incident of March 1914. In order to secure strategically important locations in Ulster troops were ordered north to reinforce the weak garrison that was vulnerable to UVF attack. Such a measure was purely precautionary but was interpreted by the officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade as a move against ‘loyal’ Ulster. 57 of the 70 officers including their GOC resigned; the War Office who had mishandled the whole operation, backed down and said that the military option would not be used. Thus, Asquith was shown to have no credible deterrent. In April the UVF landed and distributed their major consignment of rifles at Larne without a shot being fired, thus humiliating the government, indicating that the initiative lay with the Ulstermen. Though the UVF would have suffered from severe military deficiencies, once the government had conceded that the army would not be used the UVF had achieved one of the Ulster Unionist goals of destroying the political and practical options for the implementation of home rule. The outbreak of war saved Asquith from an impossible situation that could have led to civil war in both islands. It also saved Carson (who had failed to prevent Home Rule in three of the provinces) from precipitating civil war over “the stay of execution” (i.e. the six year delay) and the fate of Tyrone and Fermanagh – the Unionists had virtually realised they could no longer include the three Ulster Counties with absolute nationalist majorities (Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal). They could only hope to include the two marginal countries, Tyrone and Fermanagh, and add them to the Unionist majority counties of Down, Antrim, Armagh and Londonderry. In all probability a six-year delay would have become permanent so it would seem that civil war was being risked over the fifth and sixth counties. Moreover nationalists had been noting the apparent success of armed defiance against a purposeless government. Thus the Ulster Unionists brought the gun back into Irish politics and created a myth as powerful as that of Easter 1916. Doc 9viiia UVF Intelligence Preparations by the Chairman of the Larne Harbour Board “Dear Reade - I have been away for a few days and have not got all the information I would like. I send you all I have got and will send more later. There is an A[ncient] O[rder] of H[ibernian] lodge here and in Carnlough the President here is J Cunningham a railway clerk and the Secretary is a painter whose name I forget at the moment, will get this again. I cannot find out yet about Carnlough. I wish I had never seen that district.” Yours truly W Chaine Doc 9viiib I report as follows – Larne post office Postmistress (Prot[estant]. Politics doubtful). 4 assistants (2 Pres[byterian]. 2 R[oman].C[atholic]). 7 Postmen (2 Methodists 3 Presbyterian 2 R.C.). Larne Burn-hill Subpostmistress (Prot) Cairncastle Postmistress (Pres) 2 Postmen (1 Pres 1 R.C.) Glynn Postmistress (Pres) 1 Postman (Pres) Magheramorne Postmistress (Pres. Politics?) 1 Postman (ditto) Raloo Postmistress (Pres) Millbrook Postmistress (Pres) 1 Postman (Pres) Kilwaughter Postmaster (Unitarian Politics?) Glenarm no information Carnlough do. It may be taken that Protestants are all Unionist except where so marked. W Chaine. Larne Harbour Port Office (all Unionists) Glenarm and Carnlough (no information yet) W.C. Doc 9viiic I report as follows - Larne R[ai]l[wa]y Station Station Master (Pres – Politics very doubtful) Clerks (all U[nionist] some in U.V.F.) Porters (mixed) Larne Harbour station Station Master (Pres) Chief Clerk (President A.O.H.) Signalmen (Epis. & U.V.F.) Clerks (Prot) Porters (Mixed) Glynn station Station master (R.C. bad) Magheramorne station Station master (Pres.) Porter (?) Kilwaughter Station mistress (?) Headwood Station mistress (?) It is not worth reporting porters in detail as they are always changing. W Chaine I report as follows - Larne Police Consists of 1 District Inspector. 1 Head Constable (R.C.) 3 Sergeants (2 R.C. and one vacant) about 18 Constables (5 U 13 R.C.) Glenarm Police 1 Sergeant (U) and 3 Constables (1 U & 2 R.C.) Carnlough Police 1 Sergeant (U) and 2 Constables (?) Glenarm Coastguards 1 Chief Officer (U) and 4 men (2 U and 2 R.C.) W Chaine 10. THE UNION BROKEN 1914-1921 - “A TERRIBLE BEAUTY” The formation of the Irish Volunteers Events in Ulster between 1912 and 1914 had major repercussions in nationalist circles. Eoin MacNeill, an Irish scholar and professor of Early and Medieval Irish History at University College Dublin, wrote an article, The North Began, in which he advocated the formation of a nationalist volunteer movement. The IRB was similarly impressed by the Unionist defiance of the British authorities and in November 1913 were influential in setting up the Irish Volunteers in imitation of the UVF. Patrick Pearse wrote enthusiastically (though naively) of the armed Orangemen making common cause with advanced nationalists to set up an Irish provisional government in defiance of England. On the other hand John Redmond the leader of the UIL opposed the setting up of the Volunteers, but soon “vampirised” (FitzPatrick) the organisation in the usual UIL way annexing and absorbing any organisation that might be a threat to the party. Thus the Irish Volunteers seemed to become an adjunct of the UIL but despite a large nominal membership it remained a fairly feeble body, though its IRB inner core was potentially dangerous. The activities of the Ulster Unionists and the lack of real direction by the Liberal government humiliated Redmond making him not only vulnerable to the ‘angry young men’ but also to his own electorate. This is not to say that parliamentary nationalism was finished but merely that it had to deliver home rule (in which case Redmond would have pulled off the greatest coup in Irish history, something that had eluded both O’Connell and Parnell). If he failed he would possibly be vulnerable and could be eclipsed by either Sinn Fein or the IRB. His takeover of the Irish Volunteers has to be seen in this light. Fundamentally however the UIL was to be undermined by the outbreak of the First World War. The Irish Volunteers landed two relatively small consignments of arms in the days before the outbreak of war. The landing at Howth just to the north of Dublin was conducted with maximum publicity and was thus in marked contrast to the elaborate subterfuge of the UVF operation at Larne. The purpose of this was to reap the maximum publicity for the Volunteers and attract some of the limelight that had been concentrating around militant unionism. Publicity and unintended martyrdom was achieved as troops supporting the unarmed Dublin Metropolitan Police killed 4 and wounded 30. Doc 10i O’Hegarty writing as “Landen” in Irish Freedom (an IRB publication) in December 1910 had welcomed Ulster defiance. “Good! O nobility and gentry, farmers and shopkeepers and artizans, men of property and men of no property, in that part of Ulster which is afraid of the rest of Ireland, we drink a health to your arming; may you get arms, plenty of them, good and cheap, and may you get men to use them, and may they make as good use of them as did your forefathers who took up arms a hundred and thirty years ago! …. History has a fashion of repeating itself, and we welcome with a shout this revival of public arming in Ulster. One hundred and thirty years ago it began also in Ulster, but it did not end there; it ended where the four seas of Ireland stopped it. It will spread again, my merry hearts of Ulster…” Doc 10ii Patrick Pearse welcomed the home rule bill (a) but had warned that failure to enact the legislation would lead to rebellion (speech at Dublin home rule rally March 1912); (b) he then went on in The Coming Revolution (November 1913) to welcome the arming of Ulster and also to glorify bloodshed. (a) “But if we are tricked this time, there is a party in Ireland, and I am one of them that will advise the Gael to have no counsel or dealings with the Gall for ever again, but to answer them henceforward with the strong hand and the sword’s edge. Let the Gall understand that if we are cheated once more there will be red war in Ireland.” (b) “I am glad, then, that the North has ‘begun’. I am glad that the Orangemen have armed, for it is a goodly thing to see arms in Irish hands. I would like to see the AOH [Ancient Order of Hibernians, in some ways a catholic equivalent of the Orange Order] armed. I should like to see the Transport Workers armed. I should like to see any and every body of Irish citizens armed. We must accustom ourselves to the thought of arms, to the sight of arms, to the use of arms. We may make mistakes in the beginning and shoot the wrong people; but bloodshed is a cleansing and sanctifying thing, and the nation which regards it as the final horror has lost its manhood. There are many things more horrible than bloodshed; and slavery is one of them.” Advanced nationalists of whatever type saw the British government as untrustworthy (but so did many home rulers and Irish Unionists). They saw the government capitulating to a minority group within the Irish nation. They believed the government was conniving with the Ulster rebels and that it was insincere in its efforts to bring in home rule. In fact many in the cabinet were lukewarm in their attitude and Asquith failed to offer firm leadership, substituting stubbornness for decisiveness. In reality the government were thwarted by much of the establishment and by many of the forces of law and order in Ulster, who claimed they were acting in defence of the constitution – i.e. the Act of Union, which was still law and therefore could be upheld in view of the ultra vires nature of the home rule concept. Redmond pledges the Volunteers The outbreak of war had a radicalising impact in Ireland. Redmond pledged the Irish Volunteers to Ireland’s defence and many nationalists joined the British Army. Though Redmond was frustrated by the Liberal inability to implement home rule, in a speech at Woodenbridge (20 September) he pledged the Volunteers to fight “not only in Ireland itself, but wherever the firing line extends, in defence of right, of freedom, and religion in this war”. This was an extraordinary pledge despite the fact that the suspended Home Rule Act was on the statute book. He was showing nationalist Ireland’s good faith together with its worthiness to receive home rule. Although obviously struck by the rape of catholic Belgium, he was encouraging Irish participation in what was beginning to look like a long and costly war. Such a commitment (and political gamble) was quite out of keeping with nationalist hostility towards participation in Britain’s wars (for instance the Boer War). Other Irishmen were not prepared to become involved in Britain’s war and some saw this as the opportunity to rise in rebellion. MacNeill repudiated Redmond’s leadership of the Volunteers. If the Great War had been swift and glorious and home rule had been put into operation Redmond and the UIL would have sustained little damage. However the grudging treatment in which the military and political authorities accepted nationalist volunteers merely humiliated Redmond and in the longer term undermined his position. The length of the war and the events after Easter 1916 led to the eclipse of the party. The IRB retained control of key elements of the Irish Volunteers and prepared for a rising with German arms. This element of the Volunteers was relatively small but more dedicated than the numbers who followed Redmond. They kept the title “Irish Volunteers” whilst the Redmondite wing was renamed, becoming the “National Volunteers”. The polarising effect of the war Pearse, the poet and schoolmaster, wrote and spoke with enthusiasm of the beauty of young men dying before their time on the battlefield. At the funeral of the old Fenian O’Donovan Rossa in 1915 Pearse spoke of life springing from death and of living nations springing from the graves of dead heroes. In the words of Declan Kiberd Pearse “saw that in a traditionalist society it is vitally necessary to gift-wrap the gospel of the future in the packaging of the past.” (Inventing Ireland) Thus the Fenian belief in revolution springing phoenix-like from the ashes of previous risings was taken one step further with the development of the blood sacrifice that Yeats and Lady Gregory had unwittingly encouraged when they wrote Cathleen ni Houlihan in 1902. Amongst the leaders of the Easter Rising of 1916 were a number of men who were relatively moderate until the outbreak of war, at which time they became more extreme (i.e. Pearse and DeValera). Many of the cultural nationalists of the years before 1916 had not rejected home rule, they had merely become disillusioned with aspects of the party. The home rule cause in the early twentieth century spanned the nationalist spectrum just as the party of Butt and Parnell had encompassed many nationalistic elements. As it was home rule was not delivered and “England’s peril became Ireland’s opportunity”. Obsession with the glory of the blood sacrifice became linked to frustration at the government’s failure to implement home rule. Thus the war acted as a polarising agent, to a greater extent even than the Boer War, though many of the National Volunteers were absorbed into the war effort. (Some of the most active volunteers of the post 1918 fighting served in the British army during the Great War.) The Citizen Army This was also a period of labour unrest and the Irish Citizen Army had been formed to protect the Irish Transport and General Workers Union following the major lockout in 1913. James Connolly, leader of the republican Irish Labour Party, planned to use this small force to mount a republican and socialist rebellion. As this would have pre-empted and ruined the (effectively right-wing) IRB rising Connolly was abducted by the IRB and was convinced of the need for a joint operation. Connolly did not subscribe to the notion of the blood sacrifice until a later date (which ironically did create martyrs and did help form a new and successful post-1916 revolutionary climate). He did however believe to a greater degree than the mystical poets (such as Pearse and Plunkett) in the likelihood of success, moreover his ideological stance convinced him that a capitalist regime would not shell and destroy property! Perversely therefore Connolly the down-to-earth working class revolutionary was proved to be less correct than the impractical Pearse whose blood sacrifice did eventually bear fruit. Doc 10iii Pearse in his last pamphlet (March 1916) showed some indication of possible socialist influences beyond conventional republicanism, in this document the Irish people had a role as a source of sovereignty as well as being a source of suffering. Perhaps Connolly’s influence had had an effect on his thinking. The concept of martyrdom at Easter was very clear in Pearse’s mind. “The gentry …. have uniformly been corrupted by England and the merchants and middle-class capitalists have when not corrupted, been uniformly intimidated, whereas the common people have for the most part remained unbought and unterrified. It is, in fact, true that the repositories of the Irish tradition, as well as the spiritual tradition of nationality as the kindred tradition of stubborn physical resistance to England, have been the great, splendid, faithful, common people – that dumb multitudinous throng which sorrowed during the penal night, which bled in ’98, which starved in the Famine; and which is still here – what is left of it – unbought and unterrified. Let no man be mistaken as to who will be lord in Ireland when Ireland is free. The people will be lord and master. The people who wept in Gethsemane, who trod the sorrowful way, who died naked on a cross, who went down into hell, will rise again glorious and immortal, will sit on the right hand of God, and will come in the end to give judgement, a judgement just and terrible…” Easter Week 1916 The IRB intended to start the rising on Easter Sunday under the guise of a large exercise. The plans for the rising were kept secret from MacNeill, the Chief of Staff of the Volunteers, who was unaware that the IRB Military Council was operating within his movement. MacNeill cancelled the exercise (on the Saturday) when he learned of the IRB plans. On the following day the Military Council unanimously decided to start the rising on Easter Monday despite the fact that the vital German arms ship had been intercepted and scuttled by its crew. In the resulting chaos of orders and countermanded orders no more than 1,500 men rose in rebellion, nearly all of them in Dublin. In Cork the Volunteers, who were to play a significant part in the Anglo-Irish War of 1919-21, mobilised but did not fight in 1916. Thomas MacCurtain, their commander, received ten sets of confusing and contradictory orders over the Easter weekend; in the end, acting on his most recent set of instructions he decided not to deploy his men in what was obviously a lost cause. The rising was badly executed with little attempt being made to capture and defend strong points, only one commander (DeValera) bothering to give serious thought to the tactics of street fighting, significantly he was responsible for a high proportion of the British military casualties. The sites, which the IRB/Irish Volunteers/Citizen Army occupied, were public ones vulnerable to military counter attack. The state of amateur farce was at first matched by that of the crown forces within Dublin who permitted the rising to take place. After five days of fighting the rising was crushed by massive troop reinforcements and the use of artillery. Despite the unsuitability of many of the locations chosen by the insurgents the choice of prominent buildings (i.e. the GPO) and a city centre park (St Stephen’s Green) did hamper cross-city communication by the authorities and did maximise publicity. As the prisoners were marched away, they were vilified by the Dublin crowd – they had caused massive destruction to the city and much of the population had sons, husbands and brothers serving in the British Army. Inaction by the authorities The authorities wishing to provoke as little trouble as possible turned a blind eye to much of the drilling and training that took place between 1914 and 1916. An extraordinary laxness and complacency filled many in the Irish administration. Apart from poor evaluation of intelligence by the authorities, Dublin Castle was left virtually unguarded at the outset of the rising. Furthermore a significant number of officers from the Dublin garrison were at Fairyhouse Races (as was traditional on Easter Monday). Action by the authorities Within weeks of the rising the public mood was beginning to change as the leaders (15 plus Roger Casement who had attempted to recruit rebels from amongst Irish POWs in Germany) were executed. Initially 90 death sentences were passed of which 75 were commuted including that of Eamonn DeValera partly on account of his American birth. The bulk of the insurgents were interned, and some received heavy prison sentences. It is difficult to see how a government in the middle of a major war could have avoided executions. When one considers how many British soldiers were shot following trials by courts martial during the war, 16 executions does not seem an over large figure. However, the timing and manner of the executions led to the leaders becoming martyrs. In particular the execution of the wounded James Connolly appalled the Irish public. Moreover the executions brought to the fore men with a greater degree of ruthlessness and tactical sense who would be most effective once they were released from prison. Throughout the period of the Union the British authorities seldom used coercion by itself; it was normally matched with conciliation. In 1916 this can be seen as early as late May when Lloyd George was appointed by Asquith to conduct negotiations in order to defuse the situation. His proposals failed: immediate Home Rule with the 6 Ulster counties excluded for the duration of the war. Ironically the Unionists of the 6 north-eastern counties accepted the exclusion (the Unionists of Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan conceded their claims under the Covenant, amid tears) as did northern nationalists – Lloyd George who may have acted in his typical way seems may have given the impression to the Ulster Unionists that their exclusion would be permanent and to the nationalists that exclusion would be temporary. It may well be that Carson and Redmond conducted their negotiations well aware of the risks and ambiguities entailed; they appear to have had their eyes wide open (Jackson, Home Rule). The case can be made that the six county Unionists (supported by Bonar Law) and the home rulers might have come to an agreement , but a Unionist front orchestrated by Walter Long (the English ex-leader of the Irish Unionists) meant that Redmond could Doc 10iv 1916 Proclamation not accept the deal. During July, it had become clear that the Lloyd George Proposals were unworkable and lasting agreement including the unrepresentative but influential southern Unionists could not be reached. Doc 10v John Dillon, the home ruler of the Parnell era warned the government of the consequences of its tough policy in a speech to the House of Commons in May 1916. “… As a matter of fact the great bulk of the population were not favourable to the insurrection, and the insurgents themselves, who had confidently counted on a rising of the people in their support, were absolutely disappointed. They got no popular support whatever. What is happening is that thousands of people in Dublin, who ten days ago were bitterly opposed to the whole Sinn Fein movement and to the rebellion, are now becoming infuriated against the Government on account of these executions and, as I am informed by letters received this morning, that feeling is spreading throughout the country in a most dangerous degree.” Whenever the terminal decline of parliamentary nationalism set in, the failure of the Lloyd George talks caused immense damage to Redmond and his party. The IPP continued, occupying a political vacuum that was shortly to be filled by a reincarnated Sinn Fein. In late 1916 the untried rebels (and those caught up in the post-rising sweep) were released. Six months later the remaining convicted prisoners (including DeValera) were also released. By then however any chance of the British retaining or even regaining the political initiative had been lost: internment had acted as a form of political and military finishing school. The myths of 1916 Two myths were created in 1916 both based on the concept of blood sacrifice. Although the Dublin insurgents had originally hoped for a national rising with a substantial supply of German arms, the rising as it developed was likely to be a glorious failure that would galvanise the Irish nation and reawaken the phoenix-flame of the Fenians. The martyrdom of the leaders (and some of them courted martyrdom) became an even more potent version of political theatre than the rising itself. The new generation of Sinn Fein leaders were able to create a new Irish political nation based on Easter 1916. A completely different identity was created on the opening day of the battle of the Somme when the 36th (Ulster) Division lost a third of its strength as dead, missing or wounded. The 36th Division were the men of the 1914 UVF who had (like Redmond’s Irish Volunteers) been offered to the government on the outbreak of war. They kept their espirit de corps and their “Ulster” identity, their deaths whilst no heavier than many other units and formations were more significant as they were men who had signed the Covenant and been bound together by a political and religious cause. This was in addition to that of “King and Empire” that was common to all of the volunteers of Kitchener’s New Armies. In some ways the Somme forged an Ulster identity that compares with that of the Australians at Gallipoli. Sinn Fein front formed with the Irish Volunteers Sinn Fein had been blamed for the rebellion by the government; Griffith and others had been rounded up after the rising. The effect of this was to radicalise Sinn Fein, which formed a common front with the IRB and the active Irish volunteers, who were by then being released from prison. Thus Sinn Fein became the political wing of a front that had the Irish Volunteers as their military wing. DeValera was elected President of the movement and Griffith as the Vice President in October 1917. In reality the Irish Volunteers (shortly to be renamed the IRA (Irish Republican Army)) acted independently of Sinn Fein; and Michael Collins - its most able leader - acted independently of his nominal military superior. Pending a post-independence decision by the Irish people as to the form of their new government, Sinn Fein and the Irish Volunteers pledged their loyalty to the Republic as proclaimed at Easter 1916 (this was to reduce their room for manoeuvre in later negotiations). For the duration of the war the front’s efforts were concentrated on resisting further arrests and the imposition of conscription. The conscription issue, together with widespread public sympathy for the martyrs of 1916, strengthened the political position of Sinn Fein at the expense of the IPP. Although the UIL had condemned the executions and had successfully resisted conscription in 1916, they were however blamed for its eventual enactment; the tide of political and public opinion was turning against Redmond’s party. Redmond was too closely identified with the war effort and home rule, though on the statute book, remained unfulfilled. The 1st Dail Before the 1918 Military Service Act (enacted at the time of the German spring offensive, but never implemented) had helped polarise nationalist opinion Lloyd George had called together an Irish Convention in 1917 to include all interest groups. The failure of Sinn Fein to participate together with Ulster Unionist intransigence meant that these round table talks failed. In the meantime Sinn Fein was not only winning by-elections (i.e. North Roscommon, where Count Plunkett, the father of one of those executed in 1916 was elected) but also refusing to take seats at Westminster. In the 1918 general election they won 73 seats to 6 for the old UIL (by this time Redmond had died). Sinn Fein invited the representatives of other Irish parties to join them in an Irish parliament or Dail, where they declared independence. Thus Griffith’s idea of refusing to sit in a foreign capital and of operating an Irish assembly in Dublin was put into practice. Though many Sinn Fein TDs (MPs) were in prison at the time of the inauguration of the 1st Dail and the assembly members were sworn to uphold the Republic at any rate for the time being the Dail adopted procedures similar to that of Westminster. Despite republican rhetoric, the politicians in Dublin were sometimes embarrassed by and at odds with the IRA in the field. The Dail was participating in a revolution but it did not always act as a revolutionary assembly. The Anglo-Irish war Coincidentally the first deaths of the shooting war took place at the same time as the opening of the Dail (January 1919). For the next two and a half years a guerrilla/reprisal war was fought between the Crown Forces and the IRA. The Volunteers (or IRA) were not necessarily wedded to the Sinn Fein political programme or even the formal command structure of its Dail ministry or its headquarters in Dublin. Local initiatives and local loyalties played a substantial role in the IRA’s activities. Moreover Collins, both a Dail minister and the IRA’s Director of Intelligence, tended to keep to his own operational agenda and to use the IRB network to short circuit some of his superiors. The main IRA target was the RIC composed of Irishmen who were by-and-large catholic. They were vulnerable to local pressure and as much of the Irish population came to identify with Sinn Fein or remained silent their morale fell. Casualties and early retirements together with the burning of barracks meant that the RIC was withdrawn to the towns and much of the rural south and west became unpoliced. In addition the authorities became starved of intelligence as they had relied on the RIC – local men with local knowledge – for information. In response to the lack of manpower the government topped-up the RIC with ex-servicemen untrained in the subtleties of police work and hardened by the life and death of the trenches. These ex-service RIC were nicknamed ‘Black and Tans’ (the name of an Irish hunt) due to their motley uniform of RIC dark green (in short supply) and khaki. Of similar vein was the ‘gung ho’ and arrogant Auxiliary Division of the RIC composed entirely of ex-officers. These bodies acquired a reputation for ruthlessness and insubordination and thus fell prey to the highly competent propaganda machine of Sinn Fein. Erskine Childers, a brilliant and quixotic Anglo-Irishman, who had been a staunch British imperialist and eventually an intransigent republican, expertly handled propaganda. Childers’s Irish Bulletin was adroit at the use of hyperbole expanding skirmishes into battles; this was however balanced by Childers’s honesty that caused him to repudiate statements he found to be incorrect. The army tended to play a static role guarding locations of strategic importance and acting as escorts. Charles Townshend (Political Violence in Ireland) has outlined IRA strategy as taking place in three stages. During the first year – there were small-scale assassinations and ambushes of the RIC. Secondly during the earlier part of 1920 - raids were made to demoralise the RIC, destroying rural barracks and confining it to the towns, this enabled the Sinn Fein courts and local government to operate. Finally from the late summer of 1920 there were larger-scale operations by the “flying columns” such as the Kilmichael ambush when 18 auxiliary police were killed. In May 1921 the attack on the Customs House in Dublin led to the burning of tax and customs files thus making British administration increasingly difficult and frustrating. This was however achieved at the cost of many volunteers being captured. Such headline-hitting operations were part of a political initiative and could not always be justified on military grounds. In Dublin the IRA won the intelligence war, wiping out British agents and infiltrating the “G” division of the police. Michael Collins who was effectively the IRA’s operational commander not only infiltrated the “Castle” apparatus but also had his agents in the post office and amongst the ostensible establishment. The British and American press, who glamorised him to the benefit of the Sinn Fein cause, also enhanced his mystique. The IRA itself also acquired a mystique and a degree of glamorisation. With the “truce” (below), the later post-Treaty withdrawal of crown forces and the British administration there arose an understandable myth of the IRA’s ubiquity and invincibility. In point of fact the IRA was near breaking point by the summer of the truce (1921); Collinshad remarked to the Chief Secretary: “You had us dead beat. We could not have lasted another three weeks.” This fact obviously coloured Collin’s attitude in the subsequent Treaty negotiations. Public opinion in Britain was unwilling to continue a war in which the government condoned reprisals and the Black and Tans were perceived to be brutal and undisciplined. (Black and Tan and Auxiliary excesses included the “sack” of Balbriggan; the shooting of 12 at Croke Park following Collins’s liquidation of secret service agents and the burning of part of Cork city centre.) The press in calling for a settlement appealed to a nation war-weary after the Great War. The Coalition had tried the initiative of two home rule parliaments with the Government of Ireland Act (1920). This failed to provide a solution to the situation in the south though the Northern Ireland provisions of the act became operative. Security policy was by the summer of 1921 beginning to achieve results but at the cost of almost total alienation of the catholic population (and also of some southern unionists); they had lost the political battle and were therefore anxious to settle provided Sinn Fein could be weaned away from the unacceptable concept of the Republic. Partition and the foundation of Northern Ireland The Government of Ireland Act had provided for two Irish parliaments and administrations linked by a Lord Lieutenant and Council of Ireland. The original proposals had been the work of a cabinet committee chaired by the one-time Irish Unionist leader Walter Long. A nine county parliament was proposed for Ulster, the other three provinces would be represented by the Dublin parliament. It was envisaged that the fifty-fifty unionist-nationalist split within the Ulster together with the Council of Ireland would facilitate reunion. In the meantime the committee maintained that all-Irish unity could not be imposed but would eventually come about. In effect this bowed to the reality of Ulster Unionism, which had entrenched itself as a credible political and material force. Craig, however, fearing that the catholic/nationalist population of Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan would make a northern parliament untenable, lobbied for the northern unit to be limited to six counties. He was backed vigorously and successfully by Balfour. This preserved a Unionist two-thirds majority and can be considered, for better or worse, as one of Craig’s political successes. It followed the precedent of the Lloyd George proposals of 1916 when Carson had persuaded the three counties Unionists to abrogate the Covenant. The unionists of the twenty-six counties felt both bitter and betrayed by the six-county partition. In May 1921 all the members of the Southern Irish parliament were returned unopposed. Only the 4 independents were prepared to take their seats, the 124 Sinn Feiners formed the 2nd Dail. In Northern Ireland the Unionists obtained 40 seats, nationalists 6 and Sinn Fein 6. Craig, who had become leader of the Ulster Unionists some months earlier on Carson’s resignation, became Prime Minister heading a cabinet of six other ministers. The nucleus of the civil service was provided by transfers from Dublin Castle headed by Sir Ernest Clark. Clark had been transferred to Belfast in the previous autumn, thus administrative partition predated the Government of Ireland Act. With the RIC hard-pressed Clark and Craig set up the Ulster Special Constabulary as the Northern Ireland security force. Needless to say the USC was completely protestant and acquired a reputation as a sectarian body. It was however an effective tool of the Northern Ireland government and defeated the IRA. The northern counties experienced less IRA activity at this stage than locations within the south (the north received much more IRA attention in 1921 and 1922). Even in the south some areas were relatively unaffected by the war; Dublin, mid-Munster and Cavan appear to have been areas were the IRA was most active. Craig and the Northern Ireland administration were therefore well established by the time British negotiations with Sinn Fein got underway later in 1921. Though deeply worried by the talks Craig was able to withstand the threats and promises of Lloyd George, which at times he saw as of more danger than the actions of Collins and DeValera. As an MP and junior minister in the coalition cabinet Craig had had years in which to observe and assess Lloyd George at first hand; moreover he still had his contacts amongst Unionist politicians including those within the cabinet. He was able to hold his ground and resist Irish reunification and Northern Ireland’s absorption into the Irish Free State. This did not alter the fact that Northern Ireland government was Map 3 Distribution of catholics and protestants in the six counties of Northern Ireland (For comparison of population ratios in the nine counties see Map 2 page 104 and the Table below.) Although the areas with catholic majorities cover a significant area the catholic and largely nationalist population was located in the more sparse poorer border counties. The six county arrangement gave Craig his entrenched protestant majority that would have been at risk with nine county partition. The 1911 census figures shown, upon which Map 3 is based, produces the following figures. Table 10i TOTAL PROTESTANTS CATHOLICS Northern Ireland (6) 819,000 (65.7%) 427,000 (34.3%) Excluded counties (3) 70,000 (21.2%) 260,000 (78.8%) Ulster (all 9 counties) 889,000 (56.4%) 687,000 (43.6%) in a subordinate position to Westminster. Its status under the Government of Ireland Act meant that there was no legal obligation, only a moral and practical one, for London to consult or involve the Northern Ireland government. In the subsequent history of the northern state the government in London, when dealing with the south, frequently chose not to involve Craig or his successors. Collins and DeValera Michael Collins had fought in the GPO during the Easter Rising and had been interned at Frongoch in Wales. As a pragmatist he was dismissive of the approach of the romantic revolutionaries who he accused of acting out a Greek tragedy: “I do not think the Rising week was an appropriate time for the issue of memoranda couched in poetic phrases, nor of actions worked out in a similar fashion.” He was to achieve legendary status as one of the foremost strategists of the Anglo-Irish war, a status further enhanced by his death in an ambush during the Civil War. Ruthless and intolerant of the sensitivities of colleagues he made an enemy of Cathal Brugha and became alienated from the subtle DeValera. Though colleagues, both men were Collins’s superiors: he blatantly ignored Brugha and reluctantly followed the tortuous policies and recommendations of DeValera. Neither approved of his networking through the IRB and his bypassing of official channels. DeValera, the most senior commander to survive the 1916 executions, President of Sinn Fein and of the Irish Volunteers, spent eighteen months (1919-20) in the USA raising funds. He was not successful in obtaining the American government’s recognition for the Sinn Fein republic and he fell out with the leaders of Irish-America. His political agenda was at odds with the nature of the military campaign that Collins had been waging in his absence. Nevertheless there was agreement by Collins and DeValera as to the need for a truce. Although DeValera conducted exploratory talks with Lloyd George he refused to lead or be part of the main negotiations that began in October 1921. DeValera was acknowledged to be the most able Irish negotiator (Lloyd George the arch negotiator described dialogue with DeValera as rather like picking up mercury with a fork) so his refusal to attend the talks has been the subject of speculation at the time and since. Was he (as he himself claimed) preserving unity at home whilst being able to sell a possible agreement to his Dail and cabinet colleagues? Or did he send the delegation, which included Collins knowing they would have to compromise and would thus be tainted in republican eyes? He, however, would remain unsullied as the guardian of the republic. DeValera was by no means a completely doctrinaire republican or one of the die-hards like Brugha. Nevertheless his subtle scheme to preserve the autonomy of the republic was too obtuse for his colleagues to grasp and too advanced for the British negotiators. In essence DeValera’s external association formula became the post-Second World War method by which independent states could be both republics and members of the British Commonwealth. Capable of great subtlety and flexibility he could be most doctrinaire on fine points to the bemusement of both friends and enemies alike. Like Collins he was a pragmatist but the nature of their pragmatism was very different: Collins’s approach was based on immediate practicalities, DeValera’s on preserving intellectual principles. The Treaty Negotiations King George V opened the Northern Ireland parliament in June 1921; his speech was reconciliatory and paved the way for the truce between the IRA and the crown forces of the following month. This was followed by unproductive talks between Lloyd George and DeValera; subsequently full negotiations took place between a high-powered team that included Lloyd George, Churchill, Birkenhead and Austen Chamberlain and the inexperienced Irish negotiators of whom Griffith and Collins were the senior members. The British were prepared to concede dominion status but not a republic. The Irish representatives saw themselves as having plenary powers and thus failed to consult at the final stage with DeValera and their other cabinet colleagues. They therefore signed an agreement that was at best dubious to Dail members; to many it was also unacceptable. The “Treaty” as it became known provided for: Dominion status, defined as being the same as that of Canada. The right of Northern Ireland to opt out of the new state – if this right was exercised Northern Ireland’s borders would be reassessed by a Boundary Commission. The provision of base facilities for the Royal Navy at Queenstown, Berehaven, Lough Swilly and Belfast (that is assuming the North became part of the Irish Free State). Further facilities could also be claimed in time of war. Collins, the realist, being fully appraised of the weak and vulnerable state of the IRA, was most aware of the risk of calling Lloyd George’s bluff and was not prepared to risk terrible and immediate war. He interpreted the Treaty as “the freedom to obtain freedom”. Griffith, originally a dual monarchy man, was better able to accept dominion status. DeValera had instructed the Irish delegation to make the break (if they had to) on the Ulster issue, Griffith felt unable to do so; he had been duped by Lloyd George who played upon Griffith’s sense of honour. Lloyd George introduced the concept of the Boundary Commission to sugar the pill for the Irish delegation; he also seems to have tried to convince the Unionists in his cabinet together with Craig that the Boundary Commission was merely a ploy to obtain Sinn Fein acceptance of the Treaty. Dominion status was granted on the same terms as for Canada; the Irish Free State had complete fiscal control of its own affairs, control of its own army and the ability to conduct its own foreign policy. The degree of freedom possible in the latter field was not apparent to either London or Dublin at this stage. Dominion status did however mean that Irishmen were obliged to recognise George V as Head of State and not just as Head of the Commonwealth. Thus Dail members and others had to take an oath of allegiance to the King. It was this, more than any other issue that led to the Sinn Fein front breaking down and the bitter Civil War of 1922/23. The certain prospect of Northern Ireland opting out of the Free State roused little serious opposition at the time as Lloyd George had convinced Collins that the Boundary Commission would award much of Tyrone, Fermanagh, Derry City, South Down and South Armagh to the Free State. Thus the emasculated rump of Northern Ireland would be administratively and economically unviable and would have little option but to enter the Free State. Most Dail members accepted this view though the Commissioners’ eventual report (1925) was very different in content and proved to be too politically explosive to be published or acted upon. The ports aspect received little attention at the time and it was generally accepted that Britain’s needs in this respect were reasonable. In fact such a provision would limit the Free State’s ability to conduct an independent and neutral foreign policy, thus limiting its sovereignty. The ceding of the ports by Britain in 1938 (an often overlooked aspect of appeasement) meant that Eire (as the Irish Free State had become called) was able to pursue a policy of neutrality when the Second World War broke out. The Treaty debate and the coming of independence The “Treaty” was signed on the night of 6 December 1921 and was discussed at great length and with rising bitterness by the Dail. With a break for Christmas the debate continued until 7 January when the Treaty was accepted by 64 to 57 votes. Despite a very widespread public welcome of the settlement (including reluctant acceptance by many northern catholics) the narrowness of the Dail’s acceptance meant that the new pro-treaty government had limited moral authority. The Sinn Fein front had effectively broken up in the Dail cabinet’s discussions and the subsequent Dail debates. Broadly speaking the treaty supporters (of whom Collins and Griffith were the leaders) took a pragmatic line arguing that they had achieved the best deal possible while the treaty opponents took a line based on republican principle. They had pledged themselves to a republic in 1917 and on the formation of the 1st Dail and they would not, or could not, repudiate that oath. DeValera, who resigned the presidency, could not abandon the republic (though he was tortuously flexible in other views). Similarly Cathal Brugha, the pre-treaty Minister of Defence could not repudiate the republic. In his case inflexible principle was tinged (like that of all 6 of the women TDs) with a vehement anglophobia. Personal abuse helped break-up friendships and also laid bare the tensions hitherto glossed over within the Sinn Fein front. The oath and status of George V were the issues of principle over which the Dail divided, but amongst some there was a refusal to accept the IRA’s subordination to democratic decision. Thus two principles enunciated in the 1st Dail were to lead to divisions and civil war: the oath to the republic and the IRA’s oath of allegiance to the Dail. Within days Collins, as chairman of the provisional government, started to take over authority from the departing British. Despite attempts by Collins and others to bridge the gap between pro and anti treatyites the new state found itself in civil war in the summer. Doc 10vi The intensity of republican principle was expressed by (a) Mary MacSweeney, (b) Liam Mellows (c) Austin Stack and (d) DeValera. The first three speech extracts are from the treaty debate. (a) “The issue is not between peace and war; it is between right and wrong, and no man could salve his conscience talking about what is necessary for the peace of the country. I have said I stand here in the name of the dead…..” (b) “We do not seek to make this country a materially great country at the expense of its honour in any way whatsoever. We would rather have this country poor and indignant, we would rather have the people of Ireland eking out a poor existence on the soil, as long as they possessed their souls, their minds and their honour. This fight has been for something more than the fleshpots of Empire….” (c) “I, for one, cannot accept full Canadian powers, threequarter Canadian powers, or half Canadian powers. I stand for what is Ireland’s right, full independence and nothing short of it….” (d) “Whenever I wanted to know what the Irish people wanted I had only to examine my own heart and it told me straight off what the Irish wanted. I, therefore, am holding to this policy, first of all, because if I was the only man in Ireland left of those of 1916 – as I was senior officer left – I will go down in that creed to my grave….” Doc 10vii On 16 January 1922 Collins summarised what had been achieved (though at the expense of republican principle) “I never expected …. To see the day when ships should sail away to England with the Auxiliaries and the Black-and-Tans, the RIC and the British soldiery ……How could I ever have expected to see Dublin Castle itself – that dread Bastille of Ireland – formally surrendered into my hands by the lord lieutenant in the brocade-hung council chamber on my producing a copy of the London treaty?….” Two new states In due course the pro-treaty party won the Civil War, the Free State settled down as a rather restless dominion and partition became permanent. As far as the general population of the Free State was concerned more had been achieved than they could have dreamed of five or ten years before. The “freedom to achieve freedom” led eventually to an Irish Republic and full independence outside the Commonwealth (1949). Though the divisions of the Civil War were to dominate the politics of the Irish state for two generations, the Free State survived as a parliamentary democracy. Together with Czechoslovakia the Irish Free State/Eire was alone among the inter-war creations to remain democratic. Given that the state was born in violence and that the catholic church was both corporatist and authoritarian (as was DeValera) the survival of democracy owes much to the Irish Parliamentary Party. The parliamentary legacy of Parnell and Dillon who both flirted with extremism was as impotant as that of the bourgeois revolutionaries of 1919-23. A respect for parliamentary institutions was to be found on both sides of the Civil War divide. The pro-treaty governments of the ’20s went out of their way to bring the anti-treaty Fianna Fail into conventional political life. The good sense and moral propriety of DeValera ensured that there was no doctrinaire vendetta when Fianna Fail “the republican party” came to power in the ’30s. Partition, inevitable since the early years of the twentieth century, led to the setting up of a protestant statelet enjoying home rule at the expense of its large catholic minority. Though partition was inevitable the Northern Irish state was not; the Government of Ireland Act had envisaged two co-equal home rule administrations and strong provision for reunification. London, providing its Crown and strategic interests were protected, had little inclination to become re-involved in day-to-day Irish affairs; thus London was prepared to graft the northern part of the 1920 Act on to the 1921 Treaty. The two solutions were incompatible if Lloyd George’s Boundary Commission proposals were a mere blind or else a mechanism for adjusting minor anomalies of the border. Given the Northern wish to remain outside the Free State, complete integration with Great Britain with an Ulster Secretary of State in the cabinet was the only viable solution. This would have permitted a number of devolved departments to operate – responsible to Westminster rather than to a sectarian Belfast parliament. The Unionists never wanted home rule, but once it had been granted they came to appreciate its advantages, many of which were exploited due to London’s default and failure to involve itself in any consistent way until 1969. Ironically Ulster Unionists found themselves presiding over a restricted administrative and parliamentary system owing to previous unionist demands for safeguards in the context of catholic nationalist domination as envisaged in the first three home rule bills. Furthermore the northern home rule parliament was meant to function alongside the still-born southern home rule parliament for a limited period of time until unity could be established: its position was ambiguous, it was neither sovereign nor federal, nor was it fiscally viable. From Craig’s point of view however the establishment of a six-county Northern Ireland was a more secure and viable entity than one based on the complete province of Ulster; nevertheless it was inevitable that an area with protestant/unionist hegemony would develop willy-nilly as a protestant state for a protestant people. Sinn Fein and nationalist abstention from the Belfast parliament and a boycott of the state’s institutions would have made it extremely difficult to avoid sectarian and political alienation whether the partitioned area was based on six or nine counties. One cannot envisage Sinn Fein/IRA looking any more kindly on a nine county state than on a six county one. 1914-1921, an evaluation But what had been achieved since the third home rule crisis? The British government had conceded dominion status, but this was not just a result of the guerrilla war and the Treaty. The concept had been first mooted as “Dominion Home Rule” in the abortive Convention of 1917 when customs and defence were both discussed. Those talks had failed due to the lack of provision for Ulster and their boycott by Sinn Fein. Though Dominion Home Rule was rejected by the Irish Committee of the cabinet as late as 1919, it is unlikely that the government would have ignored a solution if there had been nationalist unanimity. Both the 1914 Buckingham Palace talks and the 1917 Convention showed that the British were only too willing to let Irishmen arrive at a settlement. Sinn Fein was not ready to consider the issue before the truce but as represented by Collins and Griffith it did eventually accept dominion status and (at least tactically) accepted partition. Partition was not on offer in 1917, though it was in 1914, 1916 and 1920. The 1920 Act provided the mechanism by which Northern Ireland came into being and it is difficult to see whether anyone other than Craig and the northern unionists gained anything from the events of 1917-21. That is not to say that Craig was happy with events either, but he had preserved the Ulster heartland for the union even though Northern Ireland was threatened by the proposed Boundary Commission. Ironically that threat was a useful tool in the building of the Northern Ireland state as the old Calvinist siege mentality acted as an important dynamic for the Ulster Unionists. For Sinn Fein a split sooner or later was inevitable but civil war was not; that was a direct consequence of the Treaty. Moreover though the Ulster Unionist had brought the gun back into mainstream Irish politics and the blood sacrifice had been institutionalised at Easter 1916 and the Somme, the years 1917-23 merely embellished and romanticised the role of the gunman. Thus little was gained and in terms of expense, anguish and death; much was lost and still could be lost even after some years of “peace” in Ireland. |